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**THE STRATEGIES APPLIED BY AMISOM IN
RE-INTEGRATING THE EX-COMBATANTS IN THE
TRANSFORMATION OF SOMALIA CONFLICT****Priscah Munyiva Mulinge**

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Dr. Martin OumaLecturer Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
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Peace in Somalia has remained elusive for nearly three decades since the fall of the Siad Barre's regime in 1991. International and regional organizations have tended to establish initiatives with an aim of finding lasting and peaceful solutions to this country located in the horn of Africa region. The study sought to investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM to re-integrate ex-combatants in the transformation of Somalia conflict. The study was based on the conflict resolution and transformation theories. The study utilized both secondary and primary data. Primary data was collected using structured questionnaires and interview schedules designed in line with the study objective. The unit of analysis constituted a sample size of 100 respondents drawn from the military, police, and civilian components of AMISOM and Somali Civilian Population working within Halane Base Camp, with a combined target population of 24,643. Quantitative data was descriptively analyzed using the percentages and qualitative data was analyzed using themes emerging from the data. The study found out that the reintegration strategies used by AMISOM were training of the Somali security agencies to secure the region which was the most widely used reintegration strategy employed by AMISOM followed by restoring stability. Reconciliation efforts also formed part of the top three reintegration strategies used in a great extent by AMISOM, followed by supporting dialogue among warring parties, integrating the opposing parties to the TFIs and reconciling opposing parties at war. The study concluded that AMISOM has been effective in reintegration of ex-combatants since it joined Somalia. The study recommended that there was need for the African Union and African community by extension to create

an enabling environment for success in AMISOM operations, as this would enable AMISOM to re-integrate more ex-combatants.

Keywords: *Strategies, AMISOM, re-integration, ex-combatants, transformation, conflict, Somalia.*

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Civil conflict in Somalia is considered one of the major and worst crises in Africa's recent history. Due to this, Somalia had operated with an unstable functioning government for now over twenty years. After the overthrow of the military regime in 1991 by the clan founded militia groups, the country has not experienced any government with a capacity to maintain the rule of law (Mulugeta, 2009). This conflict has caused widespread displacement of civilians, which the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates to be over 2 million displaced either within the country or within neighbouring countries (Wulf, 2009). Consequently, the country has fallen into the hands of warlords, clan militia, and lately terrorist groups like al-Shabaab (an Al-Qaeda affiliate), among other interest driven actors (Elmi&Barise, 2006). Due to the failed nature of the state, the conflict has had regional spillover effect to neighbouring countries especially Kenya and Ethiopia that are now embedded in the conflict in order to secure their domestic interests.

The International Community, in its pursuit to restore stability and peace in Somalia has taken great strides through various approaches, notably the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approval of a unilateral UN military intervention to Somalia in 1992 (Harper, 2012). Besides, other African countries like Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan, and Eritrea have for a long time been involved in finding lasting peace to the Somalia conflict under the banner of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (Eriksson, 2013).

A variety of peace initiatives have been undertaken to address the situation in Somalia supported by the international community which has produced new governments but they have not been able to establish control outside Mogadishu because none was able to gain the overall acceptance of the warring factions (Wiklund, 2013). The impact of Somalia conflict to the general population has been enormous. Since 1991, an estimated 350,000 to 1,000,000 Somalis have died because of the conflict (Brookes, Pooley & Earnes, 2015). Somalia conflict has caused insecurity in the whole country due to the Al-Shabaab Militias and this makes the civilian acquire illegal arms in the quest for their own protection. In addition to this, there is total breakdown of infrastructure in Somalia. There are poor roads network and the once beautiful city of Mogadishu stands in rumbles.

Somalia conflict also affects the region in the Horn of Africa. This has seen deployment of AMISOM troops to Somalia in the fight against the insurgents but in the process the troops have been attacked and killed in their operating bases. The neighbouring countries like Kenya have seen numerous terrorist attacks in which the Al-Shabaab insurgents from Somalia have claimed responsibility, for example, the Westgate Attack in Kenya 2013. The problems identified in Somalia tend to major on Somali's historical problems and not efficiency and effectiveness of the strategies applied by AMISOM for a peaceful Somalia. It is against this backdrop that the study attempted to investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM to re-integrate ex-combatants in the transformation of Somalia conflict.

Purpose of the Study

The general objective of this study was to investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM to re-integrate the ex-combatants in Somalia.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by two theories: Theory of Conflict Resolution using the Dual Concern Model Approach by Kilmann and Thomas (1977) and the theory of Conflict Transformation as propounded by Väyrynen (1991). The Dual Concern model of conflict resolution assumes that “different individuals have different ways in which they can deal with conflict as they gear towards resolving conflict.” The individuals may choose methods of resolving conflict and how to deal with it basing on their own interests for themselves as well as interest for others who may be affected. According to this model, group members balance their concern for satisfying personal needs and interests with their concern for satisfying the needs and interest of others in different ways. The approach outlines collaborating, compromising, avoiding, accommodating and competitive as four model ways in which conflict can be resolved (Manktelow & Carlson, 2012). Once this approach to conflict resolution is understood, the model was important in informing that findings that it was ideal to use in different conflict situations, be able to respect people’s legitimate interests and needs hence sustainable peace.

The theory of Conflict Transformation draws on many of the familiar concepts of conflict management and conflict resolution, and that it also rests on the same tradition of theorising about conflict. It is best viewed not as a wholly new approach, but rather as a reconceptualization to make it more relevant to contemporary conflicts. The theory argues that certain crucial changes in the nature of conflict call for such a reconceptualisation. First of all, most contemporary violent conflicts are asymmetric, marked by inequalities of power and status. Second, many contemporary conflicts are protracted, crossing repeatedly into and out of violence and thus defying cyclical or bell-shaped models of conflict phases. Thirdly, protracted conflicts warp the societies, economies and regions in which they are situated, creating complex emergencies fuelled on the one hand by local struggles and on the other by global factors such as the arms trade and support for regimes or rebels by outside states (Miall, 2004).

The theory of conflict transformation was important in the study in determining if parties can be helped to explore, analyse, question and reframe their positions and interests. Conflict resolution emphasises intervention by skilled but powerless third-parties working unofficially with the parties to foster new thinking and new relationships (Hill, 2014). They seek to explore what the roots of the conflict really are and to identify creative solutions that the parties may have missed in their commitment to entrenched positions. Conflict resolution is about how parties can move from zero-sum, destructive patterns of conflict to positive-sum constructive outcome.

The Dual concern model of conflict resolution and theory of conflict transformation theory were relevant in this study since the AU as an organ within the larger social milieu in the international arena has to take its rightful place towards integration of the African people by first ensuring stability and order is maintained. Therefore, its involvement in the conflict in Somalia is best supported by the theories aims at transforming and resolving conflict by ensuring that all concerns are met to achieve peace and security, which are precursors to economic productivity and prosperity. Through this, there is bound to be international collective governance and material interdependence between states.

2.2 Literature Review

Reintegration is often touted as the plan by which ex-soldiers are led to acquire civilian status and become socially accepted by the community thus gaining employment and income. Reintegration normally has two components to address in order for the process to be sustainable (Shekhawat, 2015). These are the social and economic components. As a social and economic imperative, reintegration must have a period and is generally considered as part of a country’s development, which will necessitate external assistance in the end. Through a process of social reintegration, the ex-soldiers and their families are able to feel accepted by the community at large (MacKenzie, 2012). Economic reintegration on the other hand ensures that livelihoods of ex-soldiers

are built through production or some form of gainful employment. However, the process of reintegrating the ex-combatants is likely to face challenges as the absorbed soldiers are either lacking education, unskilled or have skilled which are obsolete. In spite of these, efforts must however be made to have them have essential skills necessary to enable them earn a living otherwise they will enlist themselves in criminal gangs (Rogers, 2013).

The success of reintegration and disarmament programmes can be seen in countries that have been at war in Africa. In Sierra Leone, over 70,000 combatants were disarmed even though the reintegration process faced was the inability of the military to absorb the ex-combatants. This meant that the spillover was absorbed into civilian life in communities that were not economically prepared. Besides, the ex-combatants feared to return due to the envisaged reprisals from their communities over their actions during the conflict and this resulted to the migration of these ex-combatants to other countries in West Africa including Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire to sell their labor as mercenaries thus perpetuate instability in the region. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), reintegration of ex-soldiers into the army led to irreconcilable divisions between the ex-combatants and the national army. The sharp divisions led to the ex-combatant units' breaking away and fighting resumed in Eastern Congo (Gaffney, 2015).

Further, the failure of this reintegration programme was due to its focus on individuals without involvement of the community for sustainability purposes. It is worth noting that from the Sierra Leone and DRC experiences on reintegration useful lessons have been learnt (Dutton, 2014). Suffice to point out that reintegration programmes must be realist and need driven to reduce disappointments among the ex-combatants. In order to sustain the programmes, experts advise that the capacity of the ex-combatants need to be enhanced. Efforts such as vocational training and promotion of self-employment through agriculture in DRC have born fruits (World Bank, 2009). According to World Bank, this programme has seen about 25,000 ex-combatants and 1000 women trained in agriculture, fishing, stockbreeding, artisanal production of soap and bread making, tailoring/dress-making, welding/iron works and auto-mechanics.

The reinsertion phase is the transitional phase in which ex-combatants return to their home areas or wherever they choose to resettle. According to Munive (2013), the first ex-combatant reintegration training undertaken in Southern Sudan was carried out between June and December 2009 with support from donors. As part of the reintegration counseling, which did UNDP caseworkers jointly undertake and the implementing partners, ex-combatants were assisted to identify an economic reintegration option. The South Sudan DDR Commission's representatives had the ex-combatants sign an agreement indicating their preferred reintegration activity and the region selected for resettlement.

Reintegration process in South Sudan has faced challenges as outlined by the UNDP report on the evaluation of DDR programmes in the country. Haile and Bara (2013) outlines several factors that affected implementation of reintegration activities including poor road infrastructure, which did not allow swift movement of goods and services. Reaching beneficiaries was difficult as they were scattered throughout the vast geographical areas of the country, which were mostly inaccessible during the rainy season, creating the need for expensive undertakings to mobilize beneficiaries. Moreover, many ex-combatants were not available in their designated locations and have remained in urban areas in search of basic social services. A lack of materials in the local markets also affected programme implementation as procurement of reintegration kits could only be done abroad.

In general, studies by various scholars' notes that the success of the reintegration depends on the willingness of the parties involved. This is why it is necessary for the parties to agree on the terms of the peace agreement and commit to it. During disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration exercise, there is need to provide accurate and up-to-date data on the numbers, types and locations of forces and armaments, including storage depot sites, stockpiles and weapons caches. The figures will greatly affect the planning and therefore should

be provided at the time of signing the peace agreement as gathering the information later will cause delays in implementation of the peace agreement.

In conclusion, Mitrany (1948) observed the fact actively integrating nations was more challenging than maintaining the peaceful separation of the autonomous/ independent nations. In the present time, Mitrany's perception is an understatement about the progress of uniting countries through international and regional associations or organizations. Bringing nations together in the present times is not a challenge. Difficulties arise from conflict resolution efforts in an attempt to maintain cooperation and good relations (Baraza, 2015). This position stems from the fact regional organizations are powerful in the management of international affairs, especially during the prevention and resolution of member states' internal and external conflicts.

3 METHODOLOGY

This study adopted a mixed design strategy to unravel the effectiveness of the AU mission in Somalia. First, being an evaluative study, the research design for this study was descriptive survey design. The design was appropriate for this study, as data was collected from a cross section of the AMISOM staff in Somalia using both the quantitative and qualitative approaches. Secondly, the study applied the case study approach in trying to understand the Somalia conflict through the AMISOM intervention. The location of the study was at the Mogadishu capital where the African Union operations in Somalia are based. The study targeted 24,643 AMISOM staff and Somali civilian population.

The researcher used purposive sampling to include the individuals deemed to be have the relevant information for the study. The research also used the strata whereby the population was divided into groups depending on the demographic characteristics considered important for the analysis for this study. The sample size for this study was calculated using the under listed formula by Yamane (1967) where a total of 100 respondents were sampled.

The study relied on use of primary data. Primary data was collected using questionnaires and interview schedules containing both structured and semi-structured questions respectively. Both quantitative and qualitative data analysis approaches were applied to this study. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics were conducted through frequency counts and percentages to capture the distribution of responses on the key issues addressed in the study objectives. Qualitative data on the other hand, was transcribed, coded into themes and analyzed by use of content analysis.

4 FINDINGS

4.1 Demographic Information

The study first sought to determine the demographic characteristics of the respondents who participated in the study. The demographic information sought from the respondents in this study included: Response rate, gender, nationality, as well as the category of the respondents. This study sample size was 100 respondents targeting AMISOM Military, AMISOM Police, AMISOM Civilians and Somali civilians. On administration of the questionnaires, 85 questionnaires were returned, indicating a response rate of 85%, which according to Mugenda & Mugenda (2003) is excellent for reporting since it postulates a response rate that is above 70% and is sufficient for analysis.

Gender is a construct that influences people's attitudes and response to given situations hence this study sought to collect gender-disaggregated data and ascertain if gender differences influenced their responses. The findings are presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Gender of respondents

From the findings in figure 1, most of the respondents (81%) were male while 19% were female. The findings reflect disparities attributable to the conflict prone Somalia where AMISOM recruitment target more males in the mission operations being a high volatile region.

The researcher was interested in establishing the nationality of the respondents in this study working under the AMISOM. The findings are presented in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Nationality of respondents

Most of the respondents in the study were Somali (26%) and Kenyan (21%). Nigerians comprised 18% followed by Uganda (16%), Ghana (8.5%) and Sierra Leone (3.7%). Respondents from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Egypt and Chad comprised 7%. These findings underscore the involvement of different nationalities in the AMISOM operation in the horn of African country.

The category of the respondents was important as it informs from different dispensations the effectiveness of the AMISOM in the transformation of the Somalia conflict. The researcher sought information on the category of the respondents and the findings are presented in Table 1. The findings indicate that majority of the respondents were AMISOM police (36.9%) while AMISOM civilians were the least (9.5%).

Table 1: Category of Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
AMISOM Military	24	28.6	29
AMISOM Police	31	36.9	65
AMISOM Civilian	8	9.5	75
Somali	21	25	100

4.2 Presentation of the Findings

The study sought to investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM to reintegrate the ex-combatants in Somalia. This section shows the responses of the respondents on reintegration strategies. The researcher sought to enquire from the respondents whether re-integration strategies of ex-combatants was a strategy employed by AMISOM toward conflict resolution, and the findings are presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Programmes to Re-integrate Combatants

Figure 3 shows that half of the respondents (50%) acknowledged that AMISOM has begun employing programmes to reintegrate combatants. On the other hand, 36% indicated these programmes were unavailable and a further 14% were not aware of the existence of reintegration strategies by AMISOM. These findings could be related to the fact that different troop contributing countries coordinate different zones where such strategies might have begun and in other areas not.

Further, the researcher was interested in understanding what reintegration strategies have been employed by AMISOM and specifically to what extent. The findings are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Re-integration strategies

	Little Extent (%)	Moderate extent (%)	Great extent (%)
Reconciliation efforts	36.8	26.5	36.8
Supporting dialogue among warring parties	43.5	20.3	36.2

Reconciling opposing parties at war	50.0	19.1	30.9
Integrating the opposing parties to the TFIs	39.3	29.5	31.1
Restoring stability	9.4	28.1	62.5
Training of the Somali security agencies to secure the region	13.0	15.9	71.0
Facilitating repatriation of refugees to Somalia	47.1	27.9	25.0
IDP resettlement within Somalia	40.3	35.8	23.9

Majority of the respondents (71%) indicated that training of the Somali security agencies to secure the region was the most widely used reintegration strategy employed by AMISOM followed by restoring stability indicated by (63%) of the respondents. Reconciliation efforts also formed part of the top three reintegration strategies used in a great extent by AMISOM, 37% of the respondents acknowledging this followed by Supporting dialogue among warring parties (36%), Integrating the opposing parties to the TFIs (31%) and Reconciling opposing parties at war (31%).

On the other hand, half of the respondents (50%) indicated that reconciling opposing parties at war was the least employed re-integration strategy by AMISOM followed by facilitating repatriation of refugees to Somalia (47%) and supporting dialogue among warring parties (44%) to comprise the top three of the least used strategies. More than three quarters of the respondents (76%) indicated IDP resettlement within Somalia was used only to a little and moderate extent as a reintegration strategy with more than a third of the respondents (39%) indicating it was used to a little extent by AMISOM.

The researcher also sought to establish the relative extent to which various reintegration strategies that are used in peacekeeping operations have been effectively used by AMISOM. A multiple response analysis is shown in Table 3.

Table 3: Multiple response analysis on reintegration strategies

		n	Percent
Extent of use of Re-integration strategies by AMISOM	Very Little extent	106	19.9%
	Little extent	81	15.2%
	Moderate extent	135	25.3%
	Great extent	126	23.6%
	Very great extent	86	16.1%

The findings reveal that reintegration strategies have been used to a great extent. About 40% of the respondents acknowledge the use of at least one or more reintegration strategies in light of peace and stabilization efforts by AMISOM in Somalia. On the other hand, 35% of the respondents indicate that the reintegration strategies have been used only to a little extent. About two-thirds of the respondents (66%)

acknowledge the use of reintegration strategies to a moderate or greater extent in the peacekeeping effort by AMISOM in Somalia.

The study further sought to determine the challenges that faced AMISOM in the re-integration of ex-combatants. The findings are shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Challenges faced by AMISOM in re-integration of ex-combatants

	n	Percent
Inadequate funding to run most programme	30	19.1%
Resistance/Poor coordination from local population regarding AMISOM activities	23	14.6%
Inadequate military resources and institutional capacity to manage operations	17	10.8%
Language barrier between AMISOM and Somali	15	9.6%
Lack of strong, acceptable government structures and policies to support AMISOM	14	8.9%
Clan dynamics	11	7.0%
The militia group has developed new and strong ways of attacks	7	4.5%
Logistical constraints	13	8.2%
AMISOM attack strategies leaked to the militia group	5	3.2%
No signed peace agreement between the warring parties	5	3.2%
Death of AMISOM forces through attacks	4	2.6%
Drought and famine in Somalia	4	2.6%
High illiteracy levels among the general population	3	1.9%
Internal conflicts within AMISOM	1	0.6%

Research findings further reveal the inadequacy of military resources and institutional capacity to manage operations is among top challenges faced by AMISOM. While it accounts for about 11%, it is the third most frequent challenge acknowledged from respondents. About one in every ten respondents indicate language barrier between AMISOM and Somali challenges their mission efforts as communication with locals to build cooperation frameworks and fight the enemy are not existent. Evidently, more than half of the challenges experienced (54%) are accounted for by four reasons mentioned inadequate funding, poor coordination with local population, inadequate military resources and institutional capacity as well as language barrier.

Other challenges toward AMISOM efforts include lack of strong, acceptable government structures and policies to support AMISOM (8.9%), clan dynamics (7%), new and strong ways of attacks by militia group (4.5%), logistical constraints (8.2%) AMISOM attack strategies leaked to the militia group (3.2%) and no signed peace agreement between the warring parties (3.2%). These account for a third of potential reasons AMISOM fails to achieve its mandate in expected fashion. Moreover, the existence of drought and famine in Somalia, death of AMISOM forces through attacks, high illiteracy levels among the general population and internal conflicts within AMISOM have further derailed peace-building efforts jointly accounting about 8% of the gap.

5 DISCUSSION

The study found that the reintegration strategies used by AMISOM were training of the Somali security agencies to secure the region was the most widely used reintegration strategy employed by AMISOM followed by restoring stability. Reconciliation efforts also formed part of the top three reintegration strategies used in a great extent by AMISOM, followed by supporting dialogue among warring parties, integrating the opposing parties to the TFIs and reconciling opposing parties at war. On the other hand, most of the respondents indicated that reconciling opposing parties at war was the least employed re-integration strategy by AMISOM followed by facilitating repatriation of refugees to Somalia and supporting dialogue among warring parties.

The findings further revealed that four of every ten respondents acknowledge one or more reintegration strategies have been employed to a greater extent with two-thirds indicating the use of reintegration strategies in moderate or greater extent. This still shows the presence of a gap in reintegration activities. Haile & Bara (2013) indicated that these gaps could be associated with poor infrastructure, which does not favour the movement of goods and services. Most geographical areas as a result are not accessible especially during rainy seasons and most ex-combatants are unavailable in designated locations in search of basic social services in urban areas. Reintegration strategies have been employed slightly in a greater extent compared to disarmament strategies as a conflict resolution mechanism by AMISOM in Somalia.

Training of the Somali security agencies to secure the region was the most effectively used strategy of reintegration by AMISOM in light of the respondents' views followed by restoration of stability and reconciliation efforts. This brings to the fore the need for creation of an enabling environment for the absorption of ex-combatants and or back up reintegration strategies by the AMISOM in Somalia. These findings compliment previous findings by Freear and de Coning (2013) who establish this as some of the effective strategies to be employed in peacekeeping operations.

The study findings indicate that through a process of social reintegration, the ex-soldiers and their families are able to feel accepted by the community at large. The findings are in line with those posited by MacKenzie (2012) who further noted that economic reintegration ensures that livelihoods of ex-soldiers are built through production or some form of gainful employment. Rogers (2013) also agrees with these findings but noted that the process of reintegrating the ex-combatants is likely to face challenges as the absorbed soldiers are either lacking education, unskilled or have skilled which are obsolete. In spite of these, efforts must however be made to have them have essential skills necessary to enable them earn a living otherwise they will enlist themselves in criminal gangs.

The study also found that reintegration strategies in Somalia have been to some extent successful. Gaffney (2015) also noted that the success of reintegration and disarmament programmes can be seen in countries that have been at war in Africa. In Sierra Leone, over 70,000 combatants were disarmed even though the reintegration process faced was the inability of the military to absorb the ex-combatants.. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), reintegration of ex-soldiers into the army led to irreconcilable divisions between the ex-combatants and the national army. The sharp divisions led to the ex-combatant units' breaking away and fighting resumed in Eastern Congo. This is in line with the findings of the study.

Further, the study found that reintegration strategies in Somalia have been to some extent successful. This was in disagreement with the findings obtained by Dutton (2014) who determined that failure of reintegration programmes can be attributed to their focus on individuals without involvement of the community for sustainability purposes. Dutton (2014) also noted out that suffice to point out that reintegration programmes must be realist and need driven to reduce disappointments among the ex-combatants. In order to sustain the programmes, World Bank (2009) recommended that the capacity of the ex-combatants need to be enhanced.

Efforts such as vocational training and promotion of self-employment through agriculture in DRC have born fruits.

The present study determined that AMISOM activities were supported by various parties. The findings of the study align with the findings of Munive (2013) who found out that the ex-combatant reintegration training in Southern Sudan was carried out with support from donors. As part of the reintegration counseling, ex-combatants were assisted to identify an economic reintegration option. However, Haile and Bara (2013) noted that reintegration process in South Sudan has faced challenges as outlined by the UNDP report on the evaluation of DDR programmes in the country. Haile and Bara (2013) further outline several factors that affected implementation of reintegration activities including poor road infrastructure, which did not allow swift movement of goods and services. Reaching beneficiaries was difficult as they were scattered throughout the vast geographical areas of the country, which were mostly inaccessible during the rainy season, creating the need for expensive undertakings to mobilize beneficiaries.

Research findings indicate that inadequacy of financial resources to manage operations is a challenge as Somalia does not have the financial muscle to maintain police and military who the police who AMISOM uses in all operations. Baraza (2015) concurs that regional institutions lack the required expertise and financial muscle to mount successful interventions. Study findings further reveal inadequate cooperation from the locals regarding the AMISOM and international community efforts in peacekeeping and stabilization threatens the achievement of peace in Somalia. This was attributed to high illiteracy, language barrier between forces and civilians, logistical constraints, proliferations of arms and drought and famine in Somalia. Baraza (2015) concurs, postulating the difficulties that arise in conflict resolution efforts by failure to maintain cooperation and good relations. These results complement previous findings by Amadi (2014) who established a number of similar challenges to AMISOM operations in his an analysis of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa focusing on the African Union Mission in Somalia.

On the other hand, inadequate funding to manage operations, poor coordination with locals and inadequate military resources and institutional capacity remain the biggest challenges to AMISOM in its attempts to re-integrate ex-combatants. This is despite previous efforts by the African union to increase statutory fund transfers by double (AU, 2007). The findings of Freear and de Coning (2013) are in consonance postulating, the assembling of financial and logistical support package under difficult conditions remain a significant challenge for African Union and United Nation peace operations. Amadi (2014) concurs that the number of military resources in Somalia is still too low and there is need for increase of troops to stabilize the whole of Somalia informed by the extensiveness of the country and threat posed by the asymmetric threats by Al-Shabaab. On the other hand, the civilian component of AMISOM is also understaffed derailing the institutional capacity to achieve is stated objectives.

6 CONCLUSIONS

The study concluded that the reintegration strategies applied by AMISOM were training of the Somali security agencies to secure the region, restoring stability, reconciliation efforts, supporting dialogue among warring parties, integrating the opposing parties to the TFIs and reconciling opposing parties at war. The study also concluded that since AMISOM joined Somalia, the status of peace has improved. The study further concluded that inadequate human and financial resources for peace keeping operations were the biggest challenges toward re-integrating ex-combatants.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

The study recommended that there is need for the African Union and African community by extension to create an enabling environment for success in AMISOM operations. The current structure of troop contribution by African countries on grounds of willingness and voluntary decision does not suit the mission. It is imperative that African countries should show impartial commitment to guarantee the success of AMISOM through full contribution of troops. Moreover, it would be important if a stand by force is initiated, comprising military and civilian elements for deployment to such operations.

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