

# INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATIVE RESEARCH AND KNOWLEDGE

ISSN-2213-1356

[www.ijirk.com](http://www.ijirk.com)

## Effectiveness of Consociational Democracy in the Management of Ethno-Political Conflicts: The Case of Mandera County, Kenya

Joseph M. Mutungi, David Kikaya & Anthony Ichuloi

### **Abstract**

This paper attempts to espouse the need for a re-evaluation of the manner in which consociational democracy is organized to enhance its utility in the management of ethno-political conflicts in sub-national polities. The study findings reveal that exclusion and inequality in the sharing of employment opportunities and development projects exist despite the practice having been adopted to address them. The study failed to reject the null hypothesis ( $F_{(1,300)}=170.815; P>0.05$ ). The study hopes that the findings will inform a re-examination of consociationalism as practiced in Mandera County so that the obtaining outcomes are in sync with the concept's theory and dynamics in the polity.

**Key words:** consociational democracy, clan, inclusivity, equity, ethno-political conflicts

### **1.0 Introduction**

Society is in a continuous process of evolution and conflict is one of the drivers of that process. Given that conflict is typically a product of categorization, that fact of differentiation is enough to break or stabilize society depending on how the conflict is dealt with. Conflict thus offers new perspectives to issues and necessitates creative solutions that advance society, leaving it stable in the short term to the medium term.

Consociational democracy, a presumed democratic innovation in plural societies, has been a fertile field of inquiry and debate for modern political theorists. This type of democracy has been advanced by its proponents as suitable in divided societies – those societies that are characterized by a multiplicity of identities, each keen on

advancing its interests within a setting of competitive politics. According to Horowitz (1993), a majoritarian system is not a viable solution in political zones whose societies are highly fragmented into ethnic-identities “because it permits domination of some groups in perpetuity” and this creates a fertile ground for conflicts to thrive. The scholar appears to endorse a consultative and all-inclusive approach without overtly stating so, as a measure towards mitigating and resolving political conflicts that are inevitable in political processes.

Fishkin (2009) in making a case for consociational democracy in plural societies holds the view that it “explicitly affirms political equality”, presumably among actors, their demographic strength notwithstanding. This study however is of the view that political equality as advanced by Fishkin could be misleading because the reality remains that politics is generally a game of numbers and proportionality rather than equality would be more meaningful politically. The study further contends that to the extent that the negotiations towards consociationalism yield a workable solution that meets the needs of all actors and interest groups in a proportionate manner, then the outcome will be legitimate in the eyes of those affected.

A consociational approach to political power sharing is crucial in ensuring the stability of polities hosting a divided society (Lijphart, 2012). The key feature of a consociational political model is the inclusion of important segmental actors within the polity in the political power matrix. This is achieved through bringing together the elites of the various segments by giving them rational incentives that can motivate them towards cooperation. The focus on leadership of segments implies the absence of compelling incentives for moderate behaviour (Elissi, 2004). Society sometimes has a critical mass of moderates which if unattended to can create splinter groups and this has the effect of further destabilizing the polity, an exact opposite of what consociationalism promises to deliver. Segmental autonomy can also be used by moderates to drive a secessionist agenda rather than a uniting one, thus exacerbating the conflicts the model seeks to find a solution to.

However, the argument by consociational theorists that ethnic identities will lose their salience following the formation of a grand coalition government is inconclusive and perhaps misleading as it offers no insights on how reconciliation will be facilitated, the worth of institutionalizing identity or the structures that ameliorate interethnic tensions. This study thus sought to evaluate the extent to which consociational democracy had contributed to peace and stability in Mandera County following its adoption in 2013. The study set out to establish this by examining the political dispute resolution mechanisms in the pre-consociational period, respondents views on fairness in sharing of elective and appointive positions, occurrence of violent politically motivated inter clan conflicts, extent of consultations across the population segments on governance items, trends in political disputes filed in courts and extent of support for the practice by juxtaposing the 2013 and 2017 election cycles. The weaknesses of the consociational model were also examined with a view to making recommendations to address the drawbacks.

## 2.0 Literature Review

Effectiveness of democracy in general and its variants has attracted the interest of some scholars and researchers in the realm of political science. In a comparative study carried out by Magalhães (2014) featuring over 100 surveys from across the world using different models, it was determined that government effectiveness in service delivery was low under some model specifications in non-democracies. In democracies however, government effectiveness tended to be generally higher owing to the existence of peaceful methods of managing disputes whenever they arose within the polity. The study further noted that inclusion of various actors within the government structure helped in stabilizing the operational environment, thus contributing to government effectiveness. The findings of this study on the subject of performance of democracies is lend credence by Ringen (2017) who argues that the general notion that autocracies deliver while democracies dither was wrong and

misplaced. In his view, democratic governments are not only fair but also more effective in delivering on their mandate as compared to other forms of governance because of their wide inclusion of stakeholders and the existence of accountability mechanisms.

In another study conducted by Zuhair (2008) in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka on their experience with power sharing, the key plank of consociational democracy, she found that Northern Ireland was progressing well in the post Belfast Agreement of 1998 which gave her some level of autonomy and representation of various significant cleavages in the executive and national assembly. The study stresses that the level of success in Northern Ireland is attributable to proper negotiations that produced the Belfast agreement which provided for the representation of significant cleavages in a proportional manner. These findings seem to contradict those of an earlier study conducted by McGarry and O'Leary (2004) who had found that consociationalism was a weak approach to the management of the conflict in Northern Ireland because the agreement generating it had not factored in external actors, the trans-state nature of the dispute and its overemphasis on a grand coalition government. A critical review of the McGarry and O'Leary study demonstrates that the key areas they focused on namely the place of external actors and the trans-state nature of the dispute were not part of what a consociational formation should be about. This study takes the view that the authors introduced issues outside of what they were studying, that is consociationalism hence their conclusions may be inaccurate.

Salamey (2009) researching on the efficacy of consociational democracy in Lebanon established that the model was failing there over time. Even though there was fair sharing of key positions among the significant segments making up Lebanon, disagreements continued to undermine the efficacy of the state in terms of executing its responsibility through the government of the day. The religious elite failed to integrate the secular groups within the system and this has been witnessed in the form of tensions and low key conflicts in Lebanon in the period leading up to 2008 when Qatar managed to broker a short term agreement among the segments. Regional dynamics were pointed as contributing to the instability in Lebanon, a situation that had been thought to have been cured by the consociational model as argued by Lijphart (2012). The study established that the sectarian political elite had captured the state, making it impossible for the government to deliver public goods. The study noted that the political elite had established an oligopoly grounded in patron client networks that have proved difficult to eliminate. It argued that the veto power vested in sects has undermined making of public decisions and this serves to further weaken and erode interethnic harmony and integration. In essence, the study holds the view that Lebanon is a failed or a failing case of the application of negotiated democracy.

In Ghana, the concept of negotiating democracy has been practiced in the upper Eastern region of the country. In this region, an ethno-political conflict pitting the Kusasis and Mamprusis has been going on for a while. The main bone of contention in this conflict has been a claim to traditional power, popularly known as the chieftaincy. It is important to note that the chieftaincy was the main system of governance in precolonial Ghana and in modern times, the holder has a lot of sway on the political affairs of the region, hence the intractable nature of the conflict. In a study conducted by Noagah (2013), it was established that negotiation processes aimed at resolving the conflict were always infiltrated by politicians who wanted to use the conflict to further their political goals. They specifically, the study established, whip emotions among their ethnic constituents for them to capture power in the name of the community and at the same time scuttle every effort of fairly negotiating a long term solution. Thus, most of the negotiations ended up unfruitful and reports of progress just a scheme to avert violence in the short term.

In another research conducted in South Africa by Maharaj (2008), the study established that the negotiations leading to independence and subsequent governance of the rainbow nation had all the hallmarks of consociationalism. Precisely, the study noted that the inclusion of significant cleavages within the black and white

groups helped create a tolerant society that nurtured South Africa to the level of being the second largest economy in Africa after Nigeria. During the Mandela and Mbeki administrations, the country enjoyed a lot of economic growth owing to political stability, thanks to the ability of the leaders to weave together representative governments accommodating all segments. The decentralized form of governance was aimed at giving each of the cleavages some degree of autonomy in making and implementing decisions that mattered to them.

In Kenya, the application of a negotiated approach to democracy to manage of political disputes has been recorded over time (Kajirwa, 2008; Owuoch & Jonyo, 2004). Due to the ethnicization of national politics, key political parties have been established with predefined ethnic constituencies to shore up numbers in order to win power. From the onset, key positions are shared among elites representing significant ethnic segments in the event power is obtained. The Serena Accord which paved the way for the establishment of the coalition government provided for consultations between the leaders of the parties and appointments reflecting the regional balance of the country. In a study conducted by Kadima and Owuor (2014), it was established that coalitions arising out of pre-election negotiations tend to foster cohesion especially if they are inclusive. They cited the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that dislodged Kenya African National Union (KANU) from power in 2002. Coalitions between communities that have previously bitterly contested power have also led to relative peace during the lifespan of the coalition. The study highlighted the case of the Jubilee Alliance which was crafted in 2012 and which saw improved relations between the Kalenjin and the Agikuyu communities that had previously contested. From the findings of this study, it is clear that coalitions tend to foster the concept of power sharing among the partners and by so doing enhance the chance of stable environment within which a government can execute its mandate. This argument is congruent to Ringen's (2017) argument that democracies perform better than autocracies. The only challenge arises when significant sections are excluded from governance and sharing of the benefits that accrue from being in a coalition setting.

The tendency towards efficiency and effectiveness by democracies can be attributed to obligation to deliver to their citizens, on whose behalf they hold power. Additionally, democracies tend to be more effective because the persons entrusted with offices and instruments of power rule by consent and goodwill of the citizens as Körösényi (2005) argues, hence making it easy for them to get their policies accepted. Further, effectiveness of democracies is drawn from their ability to include key actors within the governance framework and by so doing minimize the opportunities for confrontations. The Global Governance Index has consistently scored democracies ahead of autocracies in terms of peace and stability and subsequently growth in various facets of development such as the economy. Scandinavian countries, North America and Western Europe are among democracies that have been rated highly in terms of political stability and good governance. East Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan which have matured into democracies have also scored well in terms of government effectiveness.

Democracy remains the most effective institutional means so far of creating legitimate coercion. However, in the contemporary world, democracy, contrary to what it has been known for many decades, seems to be facing crises of different magnitudes. Subsequently, there is need in understanding the crucial role of negotiation in generating legitimate coercion. Thus, consociationalism, a variant of negotiated democracy is significant and can be effective in building and entrenching peace and stability in democracies, at the national and sub-national levels. The effectiveness and success of consociationalism however hinges on two aspects. The first aspect is existence of zone of possible agreement on the various issues within the negotiation. Here, the negotiating parties discover the possibilities and make decisions and agreements based on them. The second aspect is the presence of differential trade-offs as a result of availability of different outcomes that the negotiating parties value and prioritize differently. There are however different factors and human errors that affect effectiveness and success of consociational democracy. These include fixed-pie and self-serving biases. Mansbridge and Martin (2015)

describe the former as referring to preconscious assumption of zero-sum conflict even when more issues can be brought into a negotiation to produce outcomes that are better for all and the latter as the preconscious cognitive bias that makes all human beings prefer ideas and outcomes that benefit them in contrast to those that benefit others (Mansbridge & Martin, 2015).

### **3.0 Methodology**

A descriptive survey research design comprising of both quantitative and qualitative approaches was used to anchor the study due to its ability to give a snapshot of the phenomena under study in its natural setting (Creswell, 2008). A questionnaire made up of closed and open-ended questions was developed to assist with data collection. The obtaining data was enriched by the use of interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) whose participants were purposively obtained by the researcher depending on the information they were presumed to have by virtue of their roles in the polity under study. In some cases, respondents were requested to give referrals (snowball sampling) to potential respondents they believed had the information the study sought. The mixing of the quantitative and qualitative methods was done during data collection to maximize on availability of respondents and richness of data. The study targeted various groups in Mandera County such as heads of households, politicians, community leaders, government officials and players in the field of conflict management and peacebuilding from the public benefits organizations. A sample size of 372 (n=372) was obtained from the target population to participate in the study. The sample size was proportionally drawn from the urban areas of Mandera Town, Rhamu and Elwak within Mandera County. Quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics as well as thematic analysis for qualitative data.

### **4.0 Findings and Discussion**

The study intended to establish whether the practice of consociational democracy had been effective in managing ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The obtaining results are analyzed and presented hereunder.

#### **4.1 Pre-Consociationalism Political Dispute Resolution Methods**

The researcher sought to establish the various mechanisms that were used to resolve political disputes prior to the adoption of consociational democracy. Out of the 350 questionnaires administered, 301 were returned, representing a return rate of 86%. The study findings are as indicated in Table 4.1. (SA=Strongly Agree; A=Agree; N=Neutral; D=Disagree; SD=Strongly Disagree)

**Table 4.1: Pre-Consociational Political Dispute Resolution Methods**

Method	SA		A		N		D		SD	
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
The courts	93	31	203	67	2	1	3	1	0	0
Council of Elders	12	4	41	14	0	0	182	60	66	22
Violence	84	28	104	34	2	1	56	19	55	18

Source: Study Findings, 2019

The study findings indicate that the dominant method of political dispute resolution used in Mandera County prior to consociationalism was the legal system as supported by 98% of the respondents. The findings imply that the area respondents have a lot of faith in the formal justice system. The findings may also imply that the society is a litigious one.

In all democracies, politicians or their supporters dissatisfied with the electoral conduct and outcome of a particular position file cases in court to contest those results. The popularity of the formal justice system may be informed by the involvement of parties outside the county who are apolitical, working within the confines of the law and with no direct interest in local politics. This mechanism has also been used for many decades across the world in resolving political disputes, yielding a mixture of outcomes ranging from upholding of decisions made by electoral bodies to nullification of others. The obtaining punishment and fines are also deterrence for commission of similar crimes in the future. However, the litigation process takes too long and this can delay justice because of a variety of reasons among them options for appeal or judges taking long to deliver rulings. The import of such delays was found to be a contributing factor to increased tension in the affected areas.

The study findings also established that the resort to violence was the second most often used approach in dealing with political disputes in Mandera County prior to adoption of consociationalism. This was supported by 62% of the respondents who argued that politicians incited their supporters to rise up in arms and fight what they considered to be theft of their victory or attempts to exclude "their people" from power. However, 37% of the respondents disagreed that violence was deployed as a method of forcing resolution of the contested political outcomes. The minority finding was important in that it may imply that though the majority thought violence was used to handle the disagreements, it may have been used to force accommodation of the disputants. The study established that violence was mainly used during the nomination stages of the electoral process and the intention was to drive away perceived supporters of a rival candidate or to intimidate them so that they did not participate in the actual elections. In some cases, violence was deployed during the elections to create an environment conducive for rigging the election by way of stuffing ballot boxes. A key informant working for the national government stated as follows in an interview:

This county has had episodic violent bust ups especially during electioneering period. Our investigations have consistently established that the violent bust ups were politically motivated as some politicians sought to drive away populations they deemed to be supporting their competitors or to create room for stuffing ballot boxes on the election night. The hotspot has been Rhamu where the Garre and Degodia clans have violently clashed leading to deaths and displacement.

This assertion was reiterated by various contributors during the FGD sessions held in Mandera Town. The study established from the FGD participants that the Degodia clan is the slight majority in Mandera North constituency where Rhamu is located but the Garre registered in droves there so as to defeat the Degodia in the elections of Member of Parliament. This was achieved in the 2013 general election which was followed by the 2014 Garre-Degodia clashes that left approximately 13 people dead and properties destroyed following incitement by politicians and the elite (Interpeace, 2017).

A contributor in the male FGD explained that the strategy used by the Garre worked in the 2013 electoral cycle but in the 2017 cycle, the Degodia worked with Garre candidates who were against consociational democracy to win the seat which they argued belonged to them as the majority clan in Mandera North Constituency. It is instructive to note that Mandera County had three constituencies prior to the enactment of the CoK 2010 namely Mandera West, Mandera Central and Mandera East. The new constitution created three more by reorganizing the boundaries and renaming them as follows: Mandera West, Mandera South, Banissa, Lafey, Mandera East and Mandera North, making a total of six. The manner in which the boundaries were drawn is indicative of gerrymandering. The competition thus became stiffer in the 2013 and 2017 election cycles as clans could claim dominance in particular electoral units and redistribute their voting strength to other political areas to expand their control as was found to be the case with the Garre in Mandera North in their attempt to lock out the Degodia from

the county politics. This finding partly explains the politically motivated violence in Rhamu in 2014, which is located in Mandera North following the 2013 electoral cycle.

Apart from the justice system and the resort to violence, the study also found that in some cases, the elders intervened to assist contestants from the same clan to resolve their political differences amicably. This elders-mediation approach was supported by 18% of the respondents and it was found to be practiced in political units inhabited by overwhelming majority clans where the competition was between sub-clans or county level positions which required clans to build alliances to win power. Intervention by elders was aimed at ensuring equity in the rotation of power among the sub-clans. A respondent pointed out that the weaker candidate would be convinced to drop their bid and support the stronger candidate with the promise of either future political support or compensation for the resources they had expended in the campaigns. In some cases, especially with the advent of devolution, some candidates would be promised appointment to senior county government position or any other opportunities accruing to the community from the national government.

The resort to elders was rejected by majority of the respondents 82% who argued that politics was outside the mandate of the elders in the pre-2013 political period. A probe into this argument revealed that traditionally, elders seized of cultural issues and amity of the community as a whole and politics was not one of their domains. A Murulle elder explained in an interview thus:

Traditionally, we have dealt with issues concerning disputes within and between clans. Our role in politics was limited unlike now when devolution has brought resources closer and competition is enhanced and we have to come in to help our communities benefit out of the fruits of devolution.

The study established that the entry of elders into political dispute resolution is causing fragmentations in clans as they are perceived to be partisan, dictatorial and out of touch with the evolution of politics in the polity. These reasons could explain why most of the respondents did not favour involving them in dispute resolution.

#### **4.2 Changes after Adoption of Consociational Democracy**

This question was intended by the researcher to be comparative in nature i.e. to establish any changes that the respondents identified which they associated with the onset of consociational democracy. Respondents indicated that elders were now taking a more active role in resolution of political disputes compared to the period prior to the introduction of consociationalism during which their jurisdiction excluded open active participation in politics. The participants in the FGDs argued that the increased visibility of elders in politics was mainly attributed to devolution which had brought with it a lot of resources to the county level which clans were jostling to control. A participant in the females FGD explained that:

The coming of devolution has seen many resources being brought to Mandera County. In fact our county is receiving the third highest allocation of finances after Nairobi and Turkana counties. With such large amounts of money coming in and the county government collecting more, the struggle for control of the billions is intense.

This perspective was shared by various political actors and the leadership of the Non-Governmental Organizations during interviews. As the custodians of the community interests (Kariuki, 2015), the elders were found to have become more active in the county politics in the post-new constitution era. Their major role was established to have been identification of the candidates who in their wisdom could best deliver the benefits of devolution in addition to mobilizing the masses to collectively support their decisions which they argued were made in the best interest of the community. This turn of events has raised the elders' political profile and they

were now more visible in the county politics besides being sought by the politicians keen on riding on their influence for political reasons.

The respondents further identified worsened intra and inter-clan political relations in the wake of consociational democracy. The worsening of relations at the intra-clan level was found to have been the result of perceptions that the elders were favoring some individuals at the expense of others by prioritizing the financial war chest of a candidate more than their leadership ability and popularity with the electorate. The deterioration of relations at the intra-clan level was found to be particularly pronounced within the dominant Garre clan and this was demonstrated by some politicians defying the elders' decision in support of particular candidates in the 2017 election cycle to mount their own campaigns and winning the support of the electorate and consequently the elections. A case that was repeatedly cited was that of the sitting governor and senator who had been asked by the elders not to vie in 2017 but they defied the call to support the negotiated and agreed upon candidates and successfully defended their respective seats to which they had been elected in 2013. A member of the males FGD explained the 2017 scenario in respect of the Garre clan thus:

The elders were forcing unpopular candidates on the voters and since the elections are by secret ballot, many people chose to keep quiet and support the governor and senator because they didn't want to be seen as openly defying the elders. Some youths with the support of the 'rebel' candidates openly criticized and chided the elders, something that had never happened before. Tensions at the sub-clan levels were high during the electioneering period.

At the inter-clan level, the study established that the relations between the Garre and the Degodia had worsened, with the latter maintaining that there is nothing like consociational democracy in the strict sense of the concept because the clan was not involved in the negotiations. A Degodia elder in an interview explained this position thus:

The Garre clan leadership is very arrogant. They boast of the clans' numerical strength and our (Degodia clan) dominance in Wajir County and Southern Ethiopia to deny us representation in Mandera County. We thus supported the rebel group opposed to negotiated democracy as a strategy to deny the negotiated democracy legitimacy because Garre elders refused to incorporate us in the negotiations.

Based on this key informant's argument, it can be argued that had the Garre elders granted the request of the Degodia clan for inclusion in the negotiations, there would have been more support for consociationalism and the factionalism within the Garre clan that came out would have been minimal, if at all, and unsuccessful.

It also emerged from the study that the Murulle clan was not necessarily in an alliance with the Garre clan out of choice; the clan's small numbers compared to the Garre clan and the threat of attack and expulsion forced them into the alliance. Some respondents described the alliance as the manifestation of 'coercive' politics. This dissatisfaction was aptly captured by a participant in the males FGD thus:

The Garre are taking advantage of us because they only allocate us the position of deputy governor. If we disagree with them politically, they will attack us and destroy our property. The Degodia are also not part of any negotiations as they are considered outsiders. The bad relations between the Garre and the Degodia have been the major cause of violence in Mandera County. Negotiated democracy is worsening inter-clan relations.

Based on the above findings, it is evident that intra and inter-clan relations had deteriorated in the wake of devolved governance and more so because of the manner in which power was acquired and shared. The findings on the strained intra and inter-clan relations are supported by Wolff (2010) who argues that segmentation creates fragmentations and worsening of relations within societies. This study maintains that consociational democracy had worsened intra and inter-clan relations because of the manner in which the practice was executed.

The study further established that an organic approach to political issues has grown in each clan as it seeks to maximize benefits accruing from the political space. Even though this finding was only highlighted in the FGDs, the study considered it an important development that required attention. The organic approach as a new development was demonstrated by consultations occurring at the sub-clan level feeding into the clan level of engagement and the significance of this had been a wider public participation in the political process. The benefit of the consultations was increased political awareness and strategizing particularly among the Degodia and Murulle clans. A key informant from a Public Benefit Organization (PBO) noted as follows in this regard;

In my view, there is increased awareness within the Degodia and Murulle clans as well as the corner tribes as they strategize to benefit from the Garre clan political fallouts. The split of the Murulle in the same manner as the Garre meant the clan would retain its deputy governor position as well as the Mandera East and Lafey parliamentary seats. The Degodia allied with the rebellious faction and captured the Mandera North Parliamentary seat in 2017. It would appear that the two clans positioned themselves to bargain for better power deals from the Garre factions.


The foregoing finding makes it clear that small but significant segments within a polity seek for opportunities that guarantee them maximum benefits by pooling their numbers or splitting them as appropriate. They strategize in a way that allows them benefit whichever way the contest goes. The study also takes note of the central position of the Garre clan in the county politics as every decision of the other clans is pegged on developments within it. Consultations among the smaller clans coupled with strategizing saw them benefit in 2017 more than they did in the first county government and political leadership. Though not the kind of outcomes that are contemplated by the proponents of consociationalism, the changes have influenced the political landscape of Mandera County in a major way.

#### ***4.3 Outcomes of Consociational Negotiated Democracy***

In this section, the researcher developed five statements to complement the responses from the open ended questions and the FGDs and key informant interviews with regard to specific aspects of the study. The researcher considered responses to those statements together with data emerging from the FGDs and key informant interviews as important in making a determination on the extent of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. The findings of the study are presented and discussed as per each item.

##### ***4.3.1 Inclusion of All Clans in the County Political Leadership and Governance***

This aspect of the research question sought to establish the extent to which consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.1.



**Figure 4.1: Inclusion of All Clans in the County Political Leadership and Governance**

The findings as presented in Figure 4.1 indicate that 36% of the respondents agreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance, a view shared by another 6% of them who strongly agreed in favour of the study item. More than half of the respondents (56%) disagreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to inclusion of all clans in the county political leadership and governance, with 27% of them expressing strong disagreement. About 2% of the respondents were indifferent.

The study findings suggest that a majority of the respondents, 56%, did not consider consociational negotiated democracy as practiced in Mandera County as entrenching inclusivity of all population segments in the political leadership and governance of the county. The findings imply that respondents from particular clans did not think consociational negotiated democracy was a fair political system. The study observed that the sizeable 42% agreeing with the study item could have been drawn from clans that had benefited in different ways from the election outcomes. The respondents who were neutral were deemed as negligible in terms of swinging the foregoing observations either way.

This finding that consociational negotiated democracy had not contributed to inclusivity in sharing of political and appointive positions was corroborated by a survey of the clan affiliation of elected leaders in the county governance as shown in Table 4.2.

**Table 4.2: Clan Affiliation of Elected Leaders**


	Governor	Deputy Governor	Senator	Women Rep.	MP	MCA	Total
Garre	1	0	1	1	3	19	<b>25</b>
Degodia	0	0	0	0	1	3	<b>4</b>
Murulle	0	1	0	0	2	7	<b>9</b>
Corner Tribe	0	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>
Others	0	0	0	0	0	0	<b>0</b>

Source: Researcher's Field data, 2019

The findings illustrated in Table 4.2, it is instructive to note that the second largest clan, the Degodia only managed one position of Member of Parliament and three MCAs while the slightly numerically inferior Murulle compared to the Degodia managed a deputy governor position, two members of parliament and seven MCAs. The outcomes reaffirm the benefits the Murulle obtained from their alliance with the Garre clan. The corner tribes managed a single position of MCA. The study therefore concurred with the majority respondents on the basis of the evidence adduced above that consociational negotiated democracy did not foster inclusivity in the sharing of political positions.

#### *4.3.2 Equitable Distribution of County Employment Opportunities*

The researcher sought to determine the extent to which consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment opportunities among all the clans and interest groups. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.2.



**Figure 4.2: Equitable Distribution of County Employment Opportunities across Clans**

From the findings presented in Figure 4.2, 29% of the respondents agreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment opportunities among all the clans and interest groups, a position supported by a further 15% of them who strongly agreed with the study item. Nearly half of the respondents (49%) disagreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to equitable distribution of employment opportunities among all the clans and interest groups, with 22% of them expressing strong disagreement. A further 7% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed as to whether consociational negotiated democracy had any influence on the distribution of employment opportunities among the clans and interest groups.

The findings on this item were clear that consociational negotiated democracy did not usher equity in the sharing of employment opportunities as demonstrated by the dissenting response of 49% of the total study respondents. The researcher obtained data from the county government on the distribution of employment opportunities in four top tier cadres in the county executive across the clans which were found to be as shown in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3: Distribution of Appointive Senior County Jobs across the Clans**


<b>Clan</b>	<b>Ministers</b>	<b>Chief Officer</b>	<b>Directors</b>	<b>Senior Executives</b>	<b>Total</b>
Garre	5	14	26	15	<b>60</b>
Degodia	2	5	3	1	<b>11</b>
Murulle	2	3	3	3	<b>11</b>
Corner Tribes	1	1	1	1	<b>4</b>
Others	0	1	1	0	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>88</b>

Source: Researcher's Field data, 2019

The findings in Table 4.3 demonstrate the extent of dominance of the county executive/appointive positions by the Garre clan. From this finding, the study presumes that the lower cadres of employment in the county public service were dominated by the same clan. The study therefore agrees with the majority on the basis of foregoing incontrovertible evidence that the county appointive positions were not shared fairly or proportionally based on each clan's relative strength. The study noted that the sitting governor was not a beneficiary of consociational negotiated democracy and was therefore not bound by any pre-election consociational negotiated agreements. This could partly explain the skewed appointments by his administration in favour of members of his clan, and perhaps the faction of the clan that supported him. On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the researcher concluded that consociational negotiated democracy did not bring fairness in distribution of county government jobs as would have been expected in a consociational political arrangement. The study findings are further supported by Cheeseman (2015) and Kanyinga (2014) both of whom explain the entrenchment of cronyism and nepotism in political appointments across Africa.

#### 4.3.3 Fairness in Implementation of County Government Development Projects

The research pursued to establish whether consociational negotiated democracy had resulted in fairness in implementation of county government-funded development projects across all areas in the county of Mandera. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.3.



**Figure 4.3: Fairness in Implementation of County Government Development Projects across Sub-Counties**

The study findings in Figure 4.3 indicate that 10% of the respondents agreed that consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the implementation of development projects funded by the county government across all the sub-counties, a claim supported by a further 26% of them who stated strong opinion in favour of that study item. A combined 59% of the respondents did not support the claim that consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the implementation of development projects funded by the county government across all parts of the county, with 27% of them expressing strong disagreement. About 5% of the respondents were neutral with regard to whether consociational negotiated democracy had any influence on fair implementation of development projects funded by the county government throughout the county.

The study established that there was skewed implementation of development projects funded by the county government to favour areas that voted for the county political leadership more than the other areas which voted for the rival group especially in the 2017 election cycle. The tendency to favour areas that supported the political leadership in power was found to be deliberate; it was a way of retaining that voting bloc in future elections. A PBO key informant in an interview explained this situation thus:

Politicians do not always engage in development activities in a fair manner. There are areas that must be favored on account of their loyal support to the ruling class, at the expense of those areas that merely expressed their political right by supporting a different candidate.


A participant in the males FGD elaborated this position more succinctly:

Garre dominated areas have benefitted more from county development projects given their dominance of the county executive. Even though some Garre dominated areas did not vote for the administration in power, they still benefit because of being from the same clan with the governor, which also controls the allocation of county government-funded projects.

The assertions made by the key informants above are consistent with Cheeseman's (2015) exposition of patrimonial politics in Africa; the patron who is the politician has to keep his loyal clients - the voters happy by allocating more resources to them while sparing some to other areas in order to court them for future elections. The study however argues that given the long periods of marginalization in the county before the advent of devolution, some areas such as the urban areas may get a bigger share of development projects, not necessarily because of their support to the administration in power but because of other factors such as their strategic location in terms of advancing the county interests such as creating an enabling environment for investments.

#### *4.3.4 Successful Resolution of Political Disputes without involving the Courts*

The researcher sought to establish whether consociational negotiated democracy had led to successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts and the findings were as presented in Figure 4.4.



**Figure 4.4: Successful Resolution of Political Disputes without involving the Courts**

The study findings as presented in Figure 4.4 indicate that 39% of the respondents agreed that consociational negotiated democracy had led to successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts, with a further 7% expressing strong opinion in support of the claim. The findings further show that 36% of the respondents did not support the assertion that consociational negotiated democracy had brought fairness in the distribution and access to economic resources by all segments comprising the county population, a view shared by a further 13% of them who expressed strong disagreement. About 2% of the respondents were indifferent with regard to whether consociational negotiated democracy had bought about fair distribution and access to economic resources by the residents of the county.

Based on the study findings, it was evident that the respondents were almost evenly divided in their opinions (46% for and 49% against) as to whether consociational negotiated democracy had led to successful resolution of political disputes without involving the courts; albeit with a tendency towards disagree with the study item. The researcher went further to ascertain whether there was any increase or decrease in the number of election related cases filed in court after the 2013 and 2017 cycles and the findings indicated that in 2013, 12 cases were filed in court while in 2017, the number increased by one to 13. The neutral group of respondents at 6% was considered significant because if such respondents were to take either of the two sides, the findings would be tilted to the direction they would support. The question of resolving political disputes without resorting to the courts has been used in Africa with some degree of success, with the overriding claim being the need to understand conflicts within their social setting (Brock-Utne, 2001).

A female political leader noted that:

Even though there have been disagreements between and within the major clans in matters politics, the negotiated democracy approach helped resolve some of the disputes and thus giving stability to the county to allow for service delivery by the administration in power.

The finding suggests that, the consociational approach to the practice of politics was useful in resolving some of the political disputes. The study noted that even though there were serious fall outs following the outcomes of the election to office of the governor, the case filed in court by the losing candidate was withdrawn following

negotiations led by the elders and alternative pathway to power for the losing candidate. The study thus deduced that consociational negotiated democracy had contributed to management of political disputes in Mandera County as evidenced by the number of election related cases filed in court remaining unchanged in 2017 despite the intra and inter-clan political fallouts.

#### **4.4 Weaknesses of Consociational Negotiated Democracy**

The researcher developed this question to help establish the shortcomings in the consociational negotiated democracy approach which findings would form the basis for recommendations on how to improve the approach to make it responsive to the people's needs and consequently contribute to the management of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. In this regard, the study established that the practice suffered from susceptibility to manipulation by vested interests, the exclusion of women and youth, dependence on political goodwill and autonomy camouflaged in negative clannism. These findings are discussed below.

Responses from the open ended question pointed out that consociational negotiated democracy was susceptible to control and manipulation by politicians and other vested interests as established in section 4.5.18. The respondents backed this argument by drawing the attention of the researcher to the fact that the negotiation process was majorly funded by politicians who had a direct stake in the process and its outcomes. Other than politicians, some business persons with an interest in the economic opportunities accruing from the county government fronted certain candidates as proxies in order to attain this interest. A youthful participant in the males FGD argued that:

There is nothing like negotiated democracy in Mandera County but a capture of the political process by politicians and business people keen on controlling the resources in the county. They achieve this by using the elders who are respected in the community as opinion leaders. As long as politicians and business people fund the negotiations, the outcome will have all the footprints of their interests.

This study is persuaded by this argument made by the respondents and further espouses that politicians and business entities do not entirely support community programs and activities for purely altruistic reasons. After all, the pursuit of power is about fulfilment of interests. Cheeseman (2015) alludes to the incontrovertible reality that is corruption in African politics, noting that this is the bane of the continent's democratic reform as elected leaders and political entrepreneurs seek to amass wealth to replace part of what was spent to 'buy' the win and build a war chest for future elections. The negotiators are not free from the discreet and explicit compromise and manipulation from faceless political strategists and hitmen.

The study further established that consociational negotiated democracy in Mandera County does not include women and youth in its programming according to the respondents, a finding that is supported by the findings of Kanyinga (2014). The respondents argued that times had changed such that women had become educated and empowered to take an active role in leadership and governance and so the community's view of women as incapable of political leadership had to change. In this regard, a participant in the female FGD argued as follows:

The elders are still stuck in the past where women had no role in community leadership. They must realize that we are becoming empowered in different ways to take up our rightful place in leadership and governance. The world has become more open and tolerant to women in leadership. Look at Ilhan Omar (a US Congresswoman) who is an ethnic Somali? As women, we can perfectly balance between our families and meaningfully participate in the political life of our community.

The subject of women engagement in political leadership in Kenya is aptly and persuasively explored by Kamau (2003) who reiterates the need to mainstream women. This study agrees with her that women are not passive beings with no political interests and a contribution to make to the attendant political processes in the polities they are part of. The biggest challenge however remains the patriarchal nature of politics in Kenya and the Somali community in particular.

The study also established that consociational negotiated democracy spurred negative clannism in light of perceptions of clan control of particular political units, thus undermining unity and amity among the people of Mandera County. It would appear that the concept was not properly understood and executed in the community and clans were on overdrive to carve out niches of political control to avoid losing out to rivals, thanks to gerrymandering during the political units boundaries review. Instead of bringing people to the negotiation table to share available socio-economic and political resources, clannism was fomenting toxic relations as each plotted on how to politically and therefore economically disempower the other.

A review of the literature attributed this behaviour to historical rivalries and lack of trust among the clans. The views expressed by respondents coalesced to the position that with an area of control, a clan was safer whether in government or not as other clans would recognize that control or ownership. Exclusive clan based control of a territory implies that other clans are cut off or are regarded as immigrants who can always be evicted should they overstay their welcome. Based on this finding, the study agrees with Elissi (2004) who alluded that the exclusive territorial control by a segment increases the occurrence of conflicts between groups, the very thing that consociationalism is intended to manage or resolve. Binningsbo (2006) arguing against consociationalism and particularly its proposition for segment control notes that such an approach lowers cooperation due to trust issues. It would appear that clan territorial control only serves to amplify intergroup differences and spheres of control.

The respondents further pointed to the practice of clannism in politics as having permeated the county government public service where distribution of employment opportunities was skewed in favour of the clan in power. They pointed out that leaders controlling the levers of government favored people from their own clan, with little regard to the principles of proportionality as advocated by the proponents of consociational negotiated democracy such as Lijphart (2012) and the dictates of the CoK. Nepotism in public service reduces politics and governance to a zero sum game, producing winners, who enjoy the benefits of being in power and losers who are condemned to oblivion.

Another important finding that emerged from the study was that the consociational negotiated democracy approach is dependent on goodwill from among the people directly involved in it. This response was common among the youthful, educated respondents. A respondent explained that the approach is not anchored in any known law and any agreements arising from it are not in any way binding to the target audience. He cited several cases of politicians who went against the decisions emerging from the negotiations, pointing out that some won in the elections while others lost. It would appear that the youthful population, which is estimated at 38% of the Mandera County population by KNBS in its 2017 demographic projections, do not favour consociational negotiated democracy mainly because of their exclusion from the process leading to identification of candidates on account of their age. The study takes note that this particular demographic segment has some basic or advanced education in addition to a national and global exposure to political developments in other parts of the world, thanks to technology and hence their resistance to an elders-driven process. This argument is partly corroborated by the sentiments of a youthful male participant in the males FGD who quipped thus:

Look, we are living in a different time compared to when our fathers were our age. Things have changed and they still think they can make decisions about us and our future. Despite educating us, they do not trust us to drive the change we need. We have no choice but to defy them on matters we believe they are getting wrong. And this should not be misconstrued to mean we disrespect our parents as some elders have been saying.


The FGD further revealed increasing tension and dissatisfaction among the population in the polity, clan notwithstanding, that the elders dabbling in politics was frowned upon. Instructively, all the participants of the male and female FGDs preferred a majoritarian system of elections.

#### **4.5 Reduction in Ethno-Political Conflicts**

In this section, the researcher developed a four point likert scale with regard to reduction in ethno political conflicts resulting from the use of consociational negotiated democracy to help with the testing of the hypothesis. The researcher considered responses to those statements as important in determining the extent of reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County resulting from the adoption of consociational negotiated democracy. The findings were presented and discussed as per each item.

##### **4.5.1 Improved Cohesion among Clans**

The study sought to find out whether there was improved cohesion among the clans and interest groups residing in Mandera County as evidence of reduction in ethno-political conflicts and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.5.



**Figure 4.5: Growing Cohesion among Clans**

The findings as presented in Figure 4.5 indicate that 27% of the respondents agreed that there was a growing cohesion among the clans and groups residing in Mandera County, symbolizing reduction in ethno-political conflicts. This view was supported by a further 11% of the respondents who expressed strong concurrence with the study item. Slightly more than half of the respondents (52%) disagreed that there was a growing cohesion among the clans and groups residing in Mandera County, with 11% of them expressing strong disagreement. A significant 10% of the respondents were neutral with regard to the study item.


Based on the findings, the study established that a majority of the respondents did not think that there was any growth in social cohesion among the communities living in Mandera County. The researcher noted that stereotypes and suspicions were still high among the clans and bitterness fueled by a range of issues such as exclusion in governance and inequality in resource sharing as earlier established in sections 4.6.3.1 and 4.6.3.3 of this study. A respondent in the males FGD lamented that:

The corner tribes and the Degodia are excluded from the affairs of our county and treated as outsiders.  
The Garre are amassing the county resources to benefit themselves and dominate over other clans.

The study argues that such feelings of bitterness are indicative of the divisions within the clans and the clearest indicator of elusive cohesion that consociational negotiated democracy was intended to usher. The process of building cohesion among groups is homegrown; it comprises of trust, solidarity and collective action among groups (Brown, 2013). The unfairness in sharing of development projects across the different areas as established in section 4.6.3.3 undermines unity of purpose which in turn militates against cohesion of groups. The finding in support of growing cohesion among groups in the county as indicated by 38% of the respondents was ascribed to respondents who identified with the ruling coalition and who were benefitting from the county largesse. The neutral respondents (10%) were considered as not significant because they could not swing the finding with regard to majority of the respondents even if they were to work with those in favour of the study item's claim. The study thus concludes that the clans in Mandera County have not yet experienced cohesion and even though there is no active violence, it would only take a trigger for violence to become manifest.

#### *4.5.2 Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence*

The researcher sought to investigate whether there was a decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County. The study findings were as shown in Figure 4.6.



**Figure 4.6: Decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence**

Based on the study findings as presented in Figure 4.6, 34% of the respondents agreed that there was a decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County, a development that meant reduction in ethno-political conflicts. This assessment was corroborated by a further 17% of the respondents who expressed strong agreement with the study item. About half of the respondents (51%) disagreed that there was a decline in politically motivated inter-clan violence in Mandera County, with 16% of them expressing strong disagreement. About 8% of the respondents were neutral.

The investigation revealed that a slight majority of the respondents were of the view that there was a decline in politically motivated violence, a finding that was supported and elaborated by a national government key informant thus:

Political violence tends to be pronounced during the electioneering period. If you look at the history of Mandera County, you will notice that violence is rife during the electoral year as groups strategize and implement their plans of winning particular seats. Violence is thus conveniently used to achieve political ends after which normalcy resumes.

A respondent in the female FGD explained that:


Government officials and the NCIC have been working hard to contain political violence, thus acting as deterrence for war mongers. The period after elections is always calm in terms of inter-clan violence as the reality is that elections are an event and when they are over, people move on with their normal routines.

The explanations given by the two respondents are consistent that political violence was high during the electoral period beyond which there was no motivation for it and this is supported by Oyugi (2000) who contends that political violence was a periodic phenomenon in Kenya. The study contends that the fact that there was decline in political violence did not necessarily mean that consociational negotiated democracy had contributed to the decline; rather the electoral cycle acts as a catalyst for it.

#### *4.5.3 Voluntary surrender of defense/offence weapons*

The study sought to establish whether civilian residents of Mandera County were voluntarily surrendering weapons in their possession which they had used to propagate politically motivated violence and the findings were as shown in Figure 4.7.

The findings as presented in Figure 4.7 show that 17% of the respondents agreed that illegally held defense/offense weapons were being voluntarily surrendered by the residents, a view shared by a further 13% of them who strongly agreed with the assertion made by the study item. About 69% of the respondents expressed disagreement with the study item, 30% of them strongly disagreeing. The rest of the respondents (2%) were neutral.



**Figure 4.7: Voluntary Surrender of defense/offence weapons**


A majority of the respondents (69%) disagreed that there was voluntary surrender of weapons from among the residents, a position supported by a key informant conversant with security issues in the county who explained that:

Mandera County shares borders with the Federal Republics of Somalia and Ethiopia. The internal and external threats to the residents are many and they have had to acquire weapons from the black market to protect themselves given the inadequacy of security officers in the area. There hasn't been anyone voluntarily surrendering their illegally held weapons to the authorities.

These findings point to the burden of self-defense that residents have to contend with, a situation that has forced them to acquire weapons which at times they use to perpetrate political violence against each other during the electoral cycle when ethnic passions become mobilized. The study finding is supported by the KNFP Survey (2011) which established that political cycles witness the proliferation and use of small arms and light weapons to intimidate or drive away perceived hostile populations, a situation exacerbated by negative ethnicity and the presence of ungoverned spaces especially in the peripheral areas of the country such as Mandera County.

#### 4.5.4 Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile

This aspect of the research was intended to establish whether settlement patterns had changed such that people from the different clans were settling in places previously considered hostile on account of the dominance of a particular clan. The findings of the inquiry were as illustrated in Figure 4.8.



**Figure 4.8: Settlement of people in places previously considered hostile**

The research findings indicated in Figure 4.8 show that 17% of the respondents agreed that residents of Mandera County were freely settling in areas that had previously been considered hostile due to politically motivated inter-clan rivalries. A further 10% of them strongly agreed with the claim made by the study item. About 67% of the respondents expressed disagreement with the study item, 27% of them strongly disagreeing. The rest of the respondents (6%) were neutral.

The study findings manifest that a majority of the respondents (67%) did not think that people felt secure enough to freely settle in areas that had previously been considered hostile during the violent conflicts period. The researcher established that there were some areas where particular communities were dominant and hence individuals from other communities did not feel safe enough to settle there and neither were they welcome by the dominant group in the area. A Murulle elder explained the partitioning phenomenon thus:

It is normal that particular clans dominate particular areas and are very protective of such dominance especially because of its value in terms of political strength during voting. For instance the Garre are dominant in Mandera West, Banissa and Mandera South sub-counties while the Degodia claim majority population in Mandera North sub-county. As such, the Degodia do not feel very safe settling in an area where their rival clan is dominant.

This finding is supported by the findings of this research as explained in section 4.4. The study argues that in multi-cultural societies, there is a tendency by groups that are sensitive to their primordial identities to demographically dominate an area, including in its political and economic spheres. The assertion is supported by Boone (2012) who argues that land and distributive politics characterize the politically motivated violent conflicts that were witnessed in the former Rift Valley province of Kenya following the reintroduction of multiparty politics in Kenya in the early 1990s. Thus the study maintains that the residents of Mandera County do not feel safe enough to settle in areas they consider hostile due to domination of such areas by a rival clan. The implication of this finding was that tensions and mistrust still persist in Mandera County among clans and therefore the possibility of ethno-political conflicts becoming violent remains high.

#### 4.6. Hypothesis Testing

The study was guided by the null hypothesis that:

Consociational negotiated democracy has not been effective in the reduction of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County.

To test this hypothesis, the F Test was carried out using simple linear regression analysis. The findings were as discussed in the following three tables. Consociational negotiated democracy was the predictor variable while reduction in ethno-political conflicts was the criterion variable.

**Table 4.4: Model summary of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.114 <sup>a</sup>	.013	.010	4.96980

a. Predictors: (Constant), Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Source: Field data, 2019

Table 4.4 indicates that the Adjusted R Square which was used to establish the predictive power of the study model was found to be .010. This implies that 1% of the variance in reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was explained by consociational negotiated democracy. The remaining 99% of the variance was attributed to factors not examined by the study. The study further checked on the significance of effectiveness between consociational negotiated democracy and reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County. A report of the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is presented in Table 4.5.

**Table 4.5: ANOVA between reduction in ethno-political conflicts and efficacy of consociational negotiated democracy**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	94.119	1	94.119	3.812	.052 <sup>b</sup>
	Residual	7382.310	299	24.690		
	Total	7476.429	300			

a. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Ethno-political Conflicts

b. Predictors: (Constant), Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy

Source: Field data, 2019

From Table 4.5 the ANOVA results demonstrate that the model is not a statistically significant predictor of effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy in the reduction of ethno-political conflicts among the different clans in Mandera County i.e. the model was not statistically significant in the reduction of ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County ( $F_{(1,300)} = 3.812$ ;  $p=.052 > .05$ ). This was further supported by the finding in the model summary in Table 4.22 which indicated that only 1% of the variance in reduction in ethno-political conflicts in Mandera County was explained by consociational negotiated democracy.

The study went further to establish the beta values and the significance of these values to the regression model. The findings were as shown in Table 4.6.

**Table 4.6: Coefficients of ethno-political conflicts and effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy**

Model	Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.217	.181	12.250	.000
	Effectiveness of Consociational Negotiated Democracy	-.110	.056	-.160	.052
a. Dependent Variable: Reduction in Ethno-political Conflicts					

Source: Field data, 2019

Table 4.6 presents the findings on regression coefficient of the study variables. The study established that the coefficient value for effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy was negative ( $\beta = -0.110$ ) while the constant had a positive coefficient value ( $\beta = 2.217$ ). Additionally, the study also established that consociational negotiated democracy had an insignificant value ( $p - \text{value} = 0.052, > 0.05$ ). As a result, the findings revealed that there was no significant relationship between effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy and reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County, Kenya. Against this finding, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.

Substitution for the simple linear equation:

$$Y = 2.217 - 0.110$$

From the simple linear model of the study; it was established that when all other factors are held constant, reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County would be 2.217. However, with the introduction of other factors such as a unit increase in effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy, this will result to a unit decrease in reduction in ethno-political conflict in Mandera County by -0.110. This revealed that there is little or no effectiveness of consociational negotiated democracy on reduction of ethno-political conflict in Mandera County, Kenya.

Based on the foregoing evidence which indicates the p value (.052) as greater than the significance level at .05, the study failed to reject the null hypothesis.

#### 4.7 Conclusion

The study concluded that consociational negotiated democracy as currently practiced in Mandera County was not effective in the management of ethno-political conflicts. There is therefore need for the actors involved with consociational negotiated democracy to rethink it with a view to ensuring that the resultant political leadership and governance is inclusive in terms of the clans and interests groups residing in Mandera County and that employment opportunity and development projects are equitably distributed. Only then will that approach to political programming attain its intended objectives.

## References

- Binningsbø, Helga. 2006. 'Power Sharing and Post Conflict Peace Periods.' International Studies Association: 1-27.
- Cheeseman, N. (2015) *Democracy in Africa: Successes, failures, and the struggle for political reform*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Creswell, J.W. (2008). *Educational Research: Planning, Conducting and Evaluating Quantitative and Qualitative Research*, New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc.
- Dixon, P. (2011) Is Consociational Theory the Answer to Global Conflict? From the Netherlands to Northern Ireland and Iraq, *Political Studies Review* 9: 309-322.
- Eliassi, Sayran. (2004) Consociational Democracy as a Tool for Conflict Resolution in Plural Societies Power Sharing in Turkey. *Lund University Department of Political Science*: 1-28
- Fishkin, J. S. (2009) *When the People Speak*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Horowitz, D.L. (1993) Democracy in Divided Societies *Journal of Democracy* 4(4): 18–38.
- Interpeace, (2009) The Search for Peace: A Synthesis Report of the Peace Mapping Study Nairobi: Interpeace
- Kadima, D. and Owuor, F., (2014) Kenya's decade of experiments with political party alliances and coalitions - motivations, impact and prospects *Journal of African Elections*, Volume 13, Number 1: pp. 150-180
- Kajirwa K. S. (2008), Political Party Formation and Alliances: A Case of Kenya, Unpublished Thesis. Atlantic International University
- Kamau, N. (2003) Do Women Bring a Different Perspective into Political Leadership? In M. Nzomo, *Perspectives on Gender Discourse: Women in Politics, Challenges of Democratic Transition in Kenya*, Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation.
- Kanyinga, K. (2014) Kenya: Democracy and Political Participation *Discussion Paper*, OSIEA
- Kariuki, F. (2015) Conflict Resolution by Elders in Africa: Successes, Challenges and Opportunities available at <http://kmco.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Conflict-Resolution-by-Elders-successes-challenges-and-opportunities-1.pdf>
- Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, (2017). Exploring Kenya's inequality: Pulling apart or pulling together? Nairobi
- Kenya, Republic of (2010) *Constitution of Kenya*, Nairobi: Government Printer
- Körösényi, András (2005) Political Representation in Leader Democracy, *Government and Opposition*, Vol 40. No. 3: 358-378
- Lijphart, Arend. (2012), *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven: Yale University press
- Magalhães, P. C. (2014). Government effectiveness and support for democracy *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 53 (1): 77-97

- Maharaj, M., (2008). The ANC and South Africa's Negotiated Transition to Democracy and Peace accessed online on 14<sup>th</sup> June 2019 at [https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions\\_Series/transitions\\_anc.pdf](https://www.berghof-foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Papers/Transitions_Series/transitions_anc.pdf)
- Mansbridge, J & Martin, C.J. (2015) *Political Negotiation: A Handbook* Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press
- McGarry, J. & O'Leary, B., (2004) *The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Noagah, B.K. (2013) The peace process in the Bawku conflict in Ghana: Challenges and prospects *Conflict and Communication Vol.* 12 (2):1-12
- Owuoche S. and Jonyo F. (2004), *Politics in Kenya; A perspective*, Nairobi: Azinger
- Ringen, S. (2017) *The Perfect Dictatorship: China in the 21st Century* Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press
- Salamey, I. (2009) Failing Consociationalism in Lebanon and Integrative Options *International Journal of Peace Studies, Volume* 14, Number 2: 83-105
- Wolff, S. (2010) Consociationalism, Power Sharing, and Politics at the Centre in Robert A. Denemark (Ed.) *The International Studies Encyclopedia*. London: Blackwell Publishing. Pp. 535-556.
- Zuhair, A. (2008) The Power-Sharing Experience in Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. *International Public Policy Review* 4, no.:47-60.