Humanitarian Intervention/Responsibility to Protect and Implications for the Rwandan Genocide

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Abstract

In the year 1994, Rwanda a small country in the Great Lakes region of Africa sometimes referred to as a country of a thousand hills hit the headlines in the international centre stage. Estimates portray that 800,000 Rwandese citizens were butchered (Thomson, 2012, p. ii). Various scholars (Lahneman, 2004, p. 67; Pieterse, 1998, p. 240; Seybolt, 2007, p. 71; Thomsom, 2012, p. ii) are in agreement that the Rwandan genocide did not merely result out of mutual hatred between the Tutsis and Hutus, and neither was it triggered by the abrupt death of the then president Habyarimana. Instead it was as a result of a well calculated public and political campaign of ethnic cleansing. The international community has been harshly criticized for its failure to act in a timely and effective way to contain the genocide in Rwanda, despite the knowledge that genocide was going to occur. Thucydides articulated it plainly in his History of the Peloponnesian War— "when the citizens of Melos refused to bow to Athens, the opinion that the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must" was confirmed in the international system. The core of the debates are the questions: how did Rwanda abruptly collapse into a civil strife? What reasons did the international community have for its failure to intervene in the Rwandan situation even after it was evident that genocide was underway? This paper is a critical analysis of the concept of 'humanitarian intervention' and its implications in the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. The paper presents an evaluation of the historical background highlighting the prior events that led to the division between the Hutus and Tutsis of Rwanda. The paper begins with an overview of various debates on humanitarian intervention. It then explores the evolution of norms regarding humanitarian intervention as well as the responsibility to protect.

Introduction

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the global community has in many circumstances considered or mounted military interventions within sovereign states to deal with humanitarian emergencies such as genocide or civil strife. Even where well-meaning states attempt an intervention, rarely do they accomplish lasting solutions to conflicts and humanitarian crises within those states. The Post-Cold War Africa bears witness to some of the humanitarian intervention failures the world has experienced. Even with the 1948 Convention on Genocide, Rwanda fell apart in the early 1990s and the Hutus and Tutsis took to slaughtering each other as the international community watched and speculated whether this anarchy was genocide or just a mere catastrophe. Simultaneously, civil strife raged, diseases multiplied, and children famished in different African countries—Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, and Angola (Murphy, 1996). These are not the only complex situations we could mention, but they make the point clear enough. However, of all the aforementioned humanitarian crises, perhaps none has been subjected to numerous debates like the international community's failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide and civil war of 1994.

The death fields of Rwanda are reawakening memories that in the last two or so decades have traumatized the world morality and ethics. Miller (2000) illustrates that humanitarian interventions are barely new in international relations, even though they have gradually come to be exposed in ethics and politics with the end of the Cold War, the emergence of new political regimes, and the breakdown of old ones. The present day conflicts pose a number of crucial challenges. The existing international law of war is caught up between the pressure to incorporate a doctrine to legitimize limited armed humanitarian intervention and its traditional concerns for nations' sovereignty. The change of the international system from Soviet-US bipolar to US unipolar has observed a new enthusiasm, driven by the United Nations Security Council, to discover internal armed conflicts (that were once chiefly outside the scope of international analysis) as threats to international peace and stability and thus as the objects of combined international action. The ensuing duty of increasing humanitarian action has however become more complex, more dangerous and more challenging than in yesteryears.

Definition of Humanitarian Intervention and What Counts as Humanitarian

Pieterse (1998) conceives "humanitarian intervention as a profoundly ideological notion in which core dilemmas of the emerging world order are reflected and which needs to be unpacked." Evidently, the concept "humanitarian intervention" invites various reactions beginning with the commendably positive to the strongly uncomplimentary. In some instances, labelling a body humanitarian implies a noble honour and profound reverence, whereas in other grounds, humanitarians are associated with do-gooders whose rosy view of human nature leads to meddlesome activities that at their worst draw in governments and entire nations. On an even more devastating note of the concept, Minear and Weiss (1995) regret that in legal and informal set ups, the concept is monotonously vague. In fact, in international law, the term "humanitarian" has not been defined and instead branded such words as human rights and refugee. The humanitarian element needs to be questioned and in fact be enclosed in inverted commas to designate that its humanitarian quality should not be taken at face value. While humanitarian intervention involves use of force, humanitarian assistance is coupled with the provision of relief.

A mid the controversies of the term, Parekh (1997) observes that humanitarian intervention is today used to define an act of intervention in the domestic matters of another state, the aim which is to halt physical suffering resulting from the collapse or the widespread abuse of the authority of the state, and helping realize sustainable environments in which civil authority can materialize. Parekh (ibid) is however, prompt to distinguish that humanitarian intervention unlike humanitarian aid, is concerned not only with mitigating suffering, but also with building peace and order. Accordingly, humanitarian intervention purposes to help create situations in which the civil authority is acceptable to the people involved. It varies from other types of

intervention in the sense that it endeavours to guarantee an arrangement developed by or in collaboration with the affected parties and not one that is outwardly enforced.

In a different definition of the term, Adam Roberts (cited in Weiss, 2007, p. 5) reinforces Parekh's definition by terming humanitarian intervention as "coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants." For an act to be humanitarian, it must outline certain conditions. The centre of the term humanitarian is actions assumed to better the human condition. An intervention is humanitarian if it fulfils two requirements: first, it should entirely or above all be informed by the feeling of humanity, compassion or empathy and as such unbiased; second an act of intervention is humanitarian if one sacrifices one's own interest for the welfare of another state.

Pieterse (1998) further builds on Parekh's and Weiss' definition of humanitarian intervention by classifying it as an armed intervention by a country in the terrain of another for the only reason of defending fundamental human rights and citizens of the affected states without being endorsed by the UN Security Council. Resolutions mandated by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are 'enforcement actions'.

Intervention is a form of intrusion that arises when an outside body breaches a state's territorial integrity by applying physical force of one type or another. It may engage military force, but not necessarily. An act of intervention results when an external body—a state, an international body or a group of individuals by use of force interfere in the domestic affairs of another state with a purpose of rearranging its domestic affairs in a definite way. A humanitarian act's purpose is to correct anything deemed as an abuse of the least that is due to any human being. Given that the position on the latter is culturally stipulated, no definition of humanitarian intervention can be culturally impartial. Furthermore, the notion of humanitarianism as understood in the international community is culturally particular and has its own prejudices that some scholars have referred to as secular and unresponsive to the other-worldly fate of the human soul.

An important factor in what constitutes humanitarian intervention is that the object of intervention must be commonly recognized to be sovereign. As it is, intervention is a breach of a state's autonomy that assumes the state in question claims the right to sovereignty. Generally, intervention means that the operation is intended to have some bearing on the conduct of the internal affairs of a state, and not to occupy it or seeking to defeat it in a military confrontation. Usually, an act qualifies an intervention if the country in question is opposed to it.

When the state collapses or becomes oppressive of its citizens, the citizens are left as political orphans. It however, becomes the responsibility of the entire international community which is for that reason obliged to restrain the warring parties, to halt disorder, and to facilitate an emergence of an environment with a legitimate arrangement of civil authority. The duty of the international community is impartiality in its role of establishing some standards of peace and civility and to support the citizens of the alarmed state to make a decision on their political destiny on their own.

Lahneman (2004) notes that what constitutes military intervention in internal conflict since the end of the Cold War is characterized by three major distinct elements: first, developed countries mount military intervention majorly for "non-traditional" reasons—which could be to avail humanitarian assistance to famished Somalis, to stop genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, to avert large scale violations of human rights in East Timor, and to reinstate the democratically elected government of Haiti; second, states only intervened militarily after a Resolution authorized by the United Nations Security Council was passed; and third, military intervention on the overall kicked of with an apparent goal of ending intervention in the shortest time possible, mainly its military aspect.

Lahneman's component of military intervention has further been strengthened by Seybolt (2007) who verifies that the UN Secretary General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change legitimized the emerging norm that there is an international responsibility to protect (civilians) in the event that genocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent'. There are four types of humanitarian military interventions classified as: (a) to support delivery of relief; (b) to guard aid operations; (c) to rescue the victims; and (d) to conquer the perpetrators. However, the aforementioned types of intervention are not exclusive of each other, instead they can be (and frequently have been) conducted concurrently, but they can also be pursued separately.

Justifications for Humanitarian Intervention

The rationales behind humanitarian intervention are nearly always diverse. Walzer (1995) cited in Miller (2000) contends that "humanitarian interventions are not justified for the sake of democracy or free enterprise or economic justice or voluntary association or any other of the social practices and arrangements that we might hope for or even call for in other people's countries. Their aim is profoundly negative in character: to put a stop to actions that shock the conscience of humankind." All states have an interest in global stability and even in global humanity, and in the case of wealthy and powerful states like the United States this interest is supported by responsibility. That interest lies in averting the intensity of perilous or liable behaviour. Uncivilized behaviour tends to multiply, to be emulated and repeated.

Solidarity in the global security is a different justification for intervention. This approach obligates states to act and stresses various features of global solidarity. The solidarity in the global village school of thought posits that what happens in one state affects all other states of the world (Miller, 2000). One obvious reason for intervention is the restraint of security risks. For example, the prices of oil or ecological conditions in one state are dependent on environmental practices elsewhere. The point of global interdependence is to draw the thin line between internal and international affairs and to enhance the spread of shared values informed by the common good of humanity as well as universal human rights.

In a different rationale for humanitarian intervention, the state-centred approach to humanitarian intervention aims at restoring both internal and international security. Civil society approaches on the other hand purpose to offer relief, and to enhance development and democratization. Pieterse (1998) furthers that approaches whose major focus is on mercy and justice are concerned with the control of refugee streams, whereas the justice approach centres on such rights as refugee asylum rights, safe havens and tribunals for war crimes.

What Miller (2000) calls "the moral leadership and virtue in the political arena school of thought" creates awareness on the outstanding position of the United States in the international system and the responsibilities that come with that position. According to this school of thought, Miller maintains "intervening is an expression of moral character, a form of virtue ethics in the political arena."

In fact Miller declares that moral leadership position is the "most altruistic" rationale of humanitarian intervention. This is so because it calls upon citizen-soldiers of a state to endanger their lives as a sacrifice of their nation's significant standing. The conventional understanding supposed that the United State's failure to intervene militarily in a given context, meant that reasonable chances of success drastically weakened. After all in a unipolar world as the present day the lone superpower is assumed to have a worldwide military reach.

Humanitarian Intervention and Sovereignty

Sovereignty in the Westphalian thought is the legal identity of a state in international law. Sovereignty affords order, stability and logicality in international relations given that sovereign states are held as equal, in spite of comparative size or wealth. Domestically, sovereignty denotes the power to make authoritative choices

affecting the people and resources within the territory of the state. Article 2.7 of the UN Charter states that a sovereign state is authorized in international law to apply exclusive and absolute jurisdiction within its territory. Accordingly, other states bear the subsequent duty not to intervene in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. In the event that this duty is breached, the victim state has the right to protect its territorial integrity and political independence (ICISS Report, 2001).

The ICISS Report (2001) documents that in an unstable world characterized by power and resource inequalities, sovereignty has tended to be the easiest line of defence for many states. Nevertheless, more literature (Bellamy, 2009; ICISS Report, 2001; Welsh, 2004) cautions that sovereignty is not merely a functional principle of international relations. In an attempt to reinforce this debate, Welsh (2004) is concerned that the subject matter of sovereignty blinds us to its form, that we fail to discern that its form compels hidden limits of its subject matter. For instance, it has long been observed that according to some heads of state, sovereignty is about doing completely as the existing government pleases, at least within what it defines as its own territory. Not only can the state at times do wrong, it can decide for itself what wrong it may do without limit.

Certainly, not even the chief propagators of sovereignty had such incoherent ideas in mind when they formulated the concept. Consequently, Archibugi (2004) observes that legal and political theorists have traditionally distinguished humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty by outlining conditions under which it is legitimate for a given state to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state. On the other hand, political theorists have debated the extent to which values of a community ought to be respected and under which contexts cosmopolitan values should be functional and obligatory. Legal theorists have further contrasted the differing claims of sovereignty principle as stated in the UN Charter and the universality of human rights as stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Implicit in a good number of literature is the fact that the present day order of the international system prevents and refrains a large number of well-meaning states to intervene in tyrannical states citing reasons of the sovereignty principle. Bellamy (2009) clearly states that interventions do not occur for the simple reason that states are not willing to pursue them. He argues that it was not restraints of sovereignty that stopped effective intervention in Rwanda, but to a certain extent the fundamental political reality that no state wanted to endanger its citizens' lives to save strangers. Archibugi (2004) bears Bellamy's opinion by propagating that states are very unwilling to intervene for humanitarian purposes and, "when they do other motivations are generally very relevant."

In matters of relations between states, the sovereign state still remains the salient unit, even though states are by no means the only important actors in international affairs. The principle of state sovereignty is still the foundation stone of international relations, despite major adjustments in its application. While international humanitarian and human rights instruments offer legally binding basis for international security and support of deprived masses within state borders, these people are, for the most part, still left in the hands of state authorities for their security and general well-being. A practical basis for dialogue is to positively propose sovereignty as an idea of state responsibility to protect and assist its citizens. Where deficiency or shortage of resources and operational capacity are demanded, they are expected to encourage or at least receive international assistance to harmonize their efforts.

Welsh (ibid) notes that the good news is that the present day sovereign states have a single "now-universal system." This means that a hidden postulation of responsibility is that where the needs of a large populace are unmet under the defence of sovereignty, and a large population in need is threatened with death, humanitarian intervention becomes imperative. Deng (2006) adds that the best assurance for sovereignty is consequently for states to execute the least standards of responsibility, if need be with international cooperation.

International Humanitarian Law

Fenrick (2005) asserts that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is "international rules, established by treaties or custom, which are specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from international or non-international armed conflicts and which, for humanitarian reasons, limit the right of parties to a conflict to use the methods and means of warfare of their choice or protect persons and property that are, or may be, affected by conflict."

In the past decades, the international legal order has proven inefficient in either reacting to or serving to standardize opinions about humanitarian intervention. The problem begins with the UN Charter which is extensively regarded as essentially non-interventionist in its advancements. The Charter limits the right of states to apply force internationally in cases of individual or collective self-defence and the assistance of UN-authorized or controlled military operations. The Charter fails to directly adopt humanitarian intervention, whether under UN backing or by states acting autonomously. Nevertheless, the Charter provides a number of rationales and regulations which are useful for humanitarian intervention.

Some pacifists, legalists or cosmopolitans would argue that generally, international law especially in the post-World War II, United Nations-based legal order were founded to prevent the option to war by powerful states. Thus any principle that would help legitimize war should be held with suspicion. Possibly a revised set of legal justifications for stipulating when military intervention in the quest for humanitarian ends is legitimate might detract from other, non-violent approaches to resolve or avert a crisis.

On a positive note, Miner and Weiss (1995) affirm that a baseline is provided by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977. Steered by the International Committee of the Red Cross, these legal frameworks acknowledge the right of civilians to have access to humanitarian assistance and of impartial aid organizations to avail the assistance. It also contrasts between the principles of *jus in bello*—conduct in armed conflicts and *jus ad bellum*—justice before war.

It is unfortunate that the aforementioned conventions only compel legal obligations to states that are signatories to the conventions. About 175 governments have ratified and 120 of these have acceded as well to one or both protocols. The basic purpose of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is to lessen net human suffering and net damage to civilian objects in armed conflict. Sadly, international law is not as binding or as firm as its domestic counterpart in its enforceability by national police and judicial procedures. It is important to expand legal principles for application in armed conflict which acknowledge the certainties of armed conflict, above all the military realities, and whose attempt at best, is to enlarge the realm of excellent military practice.

THE CASE OF RWANDA

Historical Background

The internal strain, unrest and violence in Rwanda had long characterized the Country's history. Rwanda is a country made up of two major ethnic groups— the *Hutus* and *Tutsis*, who as luck would have it speak the same language and share a common culture of the central Africa's *Banyarwanda* people. As Prunier (1995) asserts, "abstract morals notwithstanding, even tragedies do not occur in a vacuum", the political power resistances and economic rivalries between the two major ethnic groups, strengthened by the colonial powers that ruled the area, divided the population and resulted on many occasions to the massacre and escape of large numbers of civilians.

The post-colonial Rwanda emerged as a result of an influential change of power from the minority Tutsi to the majority Hutu through the 1959 revolution. The revolution ushered in a period of large-scale movement of refugees in the region, prevalent ethnic violence and political weakness. In the beginning of the 1980s, the government of Habyarimana and the one party state he had founded since 1973—the National Revolutionary Movement for Development was opposed by three movements (Lahneman, 2004).

While colonialism and the events that occurred prior to independence intensified social tensions as well as intra-Hutu cleavages between the Hutu and Tutsi, increasing poverty, largely the disintegration of world price for coffee in the late 1980s, extensively added to the heightening tensions in Rwanda and the detonation of ethnic revulsion by *Hutu* supremacists. Both domestic and international economic shocks exacerbated division and regional divides, resulting into an overall fragile state. Economic turn down and external demands for democratization stimulated local resistance movements to demand political restructuring.

Civil War and Genocide in Rwanda

Thomson (2012) records that the civil war is said to have commenced on 1st October 1990. The RPF totalled approximately 2,500. They faced FAR, the Rwandan army, numbering approximately 5,200 and equipped by the French government. President Habyarimana was determined to sacrifice Tutsis in anticipation that all Hutus would rally behind him. As it turned out 13,000 Tutsis were convicted without accuse and indicted with collaborating with RPF. Many of these convicts were tortured to death.

Three years into the civil war an internationally negotiated peace agreement appended in Arusha led to a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda and a power sharing accord between the government and the rebels. Just when the agreement was ripe for implementation, extremists within the government equipped themselves to eliminate all the Tutsi in Rwanda rather than share power. The most horrific happened when president Habyarimana died in a plane crash while returning from implementation talks on 6 April 1994. The murder of over half a million people, symbolizes a human catastrophe of draconian magnitude. Notably, majority of those who were killed were not only Tutsis, but also well-known Hutus, including the Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture who did not subscribe to the exclusivist tendencies of the late President.

The army and the *intarahamwe* militia supported by local police were the chief executors of genocide. *Intarahamwe,* a project of the government to murder Tutsis flew into action and encouraged or forced Hutu peasants to join them. Tens of thousands of Tutsis and Hutu who defied lost their lives at barricades, in their homes and in several other small scale situations. Others died in strategically organized slaughters. Sadly enough, the shocking mass execution was systematized from the capital through securely guarded official lines of authority and the pro-government radio station— RTLMC (Seybolt, 2007).

The Response of the International Community

The Role of Belgium

Belgium barely acted in response to the massacre. After the persecution that led to the death of their ten peacekeepers, Belgium lost interest in assisting Rwanda. By April 12th Belgium had withdrawn all its soldiers and military hardware from UNAMIR. Subsequent to the withdrawal, the Belgian government instigated a diplomatic campaign to terminate UNAMIR. After the evacuation of the Belgian forces, the Army Chief of Staff assured the world that the army would under no circumstances participate again in UN peacekeeping operation. This marked a significant setback since Belgium had provided the most-trained and finest-armed troops for UNAMIR. In addition, as the former colonial power, Belgium was thought to be the command most conversant and eligible to speak about Rwanda (Thomson, 2012).

The Role of the United States

Following the pull out of the Belgian troops, the US maintained that UNAMIR had nothing more to do in Rwanda due to lack of cease-fire to monitor. In point of fact, On April 16th, a US diplomat expressed that it was "unacceptable" that a "humanitarian drama" be the element of justification for maintaining the peacekeeping force in Rwanda. Still burning from the disgrace experienced in Somalia, the US had no aspiration of intervening in Rwanda. The State Department declared on April 10th that "although there had been acts of genocide in Rwanda, all the murders cannot be put into that category" hence no intervention was compelled in the 1948 Genocide Convention (Thomson, 2012, n. p.) During Security Council meetings,

Madeleine Albright, the US Ambassador to the UN delayed the voting that was meant to realize the enlargement of the UNAMIR troops as she had received no instructions.

Subsequent to the final vote, she further postponed the issue citing reasons for further assessment of the matter. Six weeks later, a mere 550 troops were in Rwanda notwithstanding that UN had approved ten times that number. Since it was acknowledged that RTLMC was instigating genocide, US officials were asked by Human Rights Watch to freeze the broadcasts. The State Department ruled, however that an international agreement on broadcasting and the American commitment to freedom of speech were more significant than breaking off genocide. In fact the US added that freezing the transmissions would prove expensive. Authorities in the State Department were aware that genocide had begun, in spite ignoring the use of the word. As fate would have it, there was no reason to intervene. After all, Rwanda was a small, poor, isolated, and no commercial or lacked strategic links, thus was beside the point to the national interests of the US.

The Role of United Nations

Lahneman (2004) reports that the instant reaction of the United Nations has been branded as generally slow. The UN dealt with the genocide as an outcome of war and made efforts to bargain a cease-fire and support the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accords. Despite the conflicting information on the ground, no one happened to understand or admit the depth of the situation. Four weeks down the massacre, nothing regarding the organized slaughter was examined once in the Security Council. Early discussions revolved around what fraction of UNAMIR would be taken away and how soon. America sought to withdraw all its workers. Britain required only a minimum force left at the rear. The discussions hardly ever referred to the doom of the Rwandans. Negotiating for a cease-fire was more significant than discontinuing the slaughter. Thomson (ibid) furthers that On April 21st, in an even more deplorable attempt the UN Security Council due to demands from America, Britain and Rwanda as a non-permanent member balloted to cut the size of UNAMIR by 90% to 270 men and constrained its mandate to mediation and humanitarian aid. The mandate did not incorporate averting the killing of civilians. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) faulted the UN of employing double standards by reducing troops in Rwanda yet reinforcing involvement in the former Yugoslavia. Doubt and contradictions were unrelenting in the face of comprehensible indications. When Resolution 918 was prepared, the UN seemed to at last react to Rwanda's misfortune. It supplied 5,500 troops under a Chapter VII authorization.

Emphasis was laid on speed of deployment as the key to the success of the new mission, but UNAMIR II did not deploy for a further three months. In reality Resolution 918 was a deception. No armed troops were prepared, no airlift was ready and there was no arrangement of what they would do when they arrive. On May 25th during a press conference, Boutros-Ghali at long last confessed that genocide had taken place and that the UN Security Council was answerable.

The Role of France

Some scholars (Lahneman, 2004; Seybolt, 2007; Thomson, 2012) contend that specified for its connections with the Rwandan army, government, and media France could not have been uninformed of the genocidal plans of many senior officers and officials. But as it will be remembered, France availed no official declaration reproving the genocide instead it sustained its support for the genocidal regime. Behind its disguise of inactivity, the French government carried on with the breach of the UN arms prohibition, making available arms on five different episodes of May and June 1994. French policymakers, led by President Mitterand had resolved to obstruct an RPF victory even if it would take the form of joint forces with the genocidal regime. Pieterse (1998) records that the French were protecting the perpetrators of genocide. An RPF conquest meant conquest for English-speaking Rwandans and a defeat for *le francophonie*. French support was verified with the start of Opération Turquoise on June 14th.

As open knowledge of the genocide became impossible to disregard, the Security Council annulled its verdict, approved strengthening of UNAMIR and permitted a French-led intervention under the flag of "Operation Turquoise." Thomson (2012) and Pieterse (1998) observe that mass killing had by that time been fruitfully accomplished. But now Rwanda's catastrophe all of a sudden turned to be central in France and a 'humanitarian' mission was invented. Thomson adds that the Operation had little, if anything to do with reality in Rwanda. In the period in-between, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RFA), the military arm of the RPF, disobeyed the ceasefire agreement, overpowered the government army, halted the genocide and led over 1 million Hutu refugees into Tanzania and DRC. The difficulties of refugees and the killers who walked among them, elicited appealed to an irresistible humanitarian aid response. One part of that response was a US military logistical attempt labelled 'Operation Support Hope'.

2,500 French troops arrived in Rwanda on June 3rd to a warm welcome in Goma by the *intarahamwe* and local authorities. The RPF were infuriated and pronounced that Opération Turquoise was an act of war. Accordingly, genocide persisted and as French troops lined up in medium sized towns, the killing was propagated in the hills. Following RPF 'victory', the French troops left Rwanda on August 21st leaving behind an accumulation of assault rifles and machine guns. Lahneman (2004) derides that "compassion fatigue had set in amongst the French public and the government tried to leave as quietly as possible despite official denials." Operation Turquoise sustained the massacre of Tutsis for an extra month and obtained the secure channel for the genocidal command to escape, with its weaponry into Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo).

The Role of Significant Others

The reactions of message of delay and reluctance, as it were was offset with messages from other countries demonstrating compliance in the killings. DRC and Seychelles supported the acting government in acquiring arms, whereas arms leaders in Israel, Albania and the UK had no sense of right and wrong about importing weapons for a regime actively carrying out genocide. Lahneman (2004) and Thomson (2012) record that the British based Mil-Tec Corporation availed the genocidal regime with £3.3M worth of mortars, grenades, rifles and ammunition between April and July 1994. In addition, DRC frustrated the flight of Tutsis tying to escape the genocide, while Kenya deported some evacuees to an almost certain death in Kigali. One year after the genocide, in July 1995, the UK government unrelentlessy contested that genocide had transpired. The OAU contrasted the decrease of UNAMIR but also declined to use the word 'genocide', recounting the murder as "carnage and bloodletting" and "massacres and wanton killings."

From Humanitarian Intervention to Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

Bellamy (2009) observes that the embracing of the *Responsibility to Protect* (R2P) was one of the countable successes of the 2005 World Summit hosted by the UN. World Leaders commonly affirmed that all states have a responsibility to protect their populace from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that they remain 'prepared' to take combined action in cases where national governments 'are deliberately failing to protect their populations' from these four crimes. In April 2006, the UN Security Council reaffirmed the R2P and expressed its willingness to assume suitable measures whenever essential (Resolution 1674, 28 April 2006).

Evans and Sahnoun (2002) support that talking about the "responsibility to protect" rather than the "right to intervene" has three major strengths: first, it means assessment of problems from the point of view of those in need of assistance, rather than those who may be considering intervention; second, this postulation means that the principal responsibility is in the hands of the state concerned. Only if that state is incapable or reluctant to perform its responsibility to protect, or the state itself the perpetrator, can the international community take the responsibility to act in its place; third, the "responsibility to protect" is an umbrella concept, embracing not just the "responsibility to react" but the "responsibility to prevent" and the "responsibility to rebuild" as well.

Both of these dimensions have not been accorded due attention in the traditional humanitarian-intervention discourse.

At the core of the concept responsibility to protect is a change in ideas about the fundamental nature of sovereignty— from control to responsibility. In the traditional Westphalian system of international relations, the central attribute of sovereignty has always been the state's capacity to make authoritative decisions regarding the people and resources within its territory. The principle of sovereign equality of states is preserved in Article 2, Section 1, of the UN Charter, and the corresponding norm of non-intervention is preserved in Article 2, Section 7. Working against this paradigm has been the increasing impact in recent decades of human rights standards, realising a shift from a culture of sovereign impunity to one of national and international accountability. Sovereignty hence involves rights and responsibilities. In view of that, only the states that appreciate, cultivate and guard fundamental rights of their citizens and in so doing perform their sovereign responsibilities can claim the complete panoply of sovereign rights.

When international agents act against (or to assist) a national authority that fails in its responsibilities by large scale violations of the rights of its populace, sovereignty cannot be said to be 'suspended' or 'overridden'. As a matter of fact, in such cases, sovereignty is actually guarded and supported because international activism purposes to generate conditions favourable for individual sovereigns to decide their own destiny. Without a doubt, even the die-hard followers of state sovereignty will acknowledge today that no state has unrestrained authority to do what it pleases to its citizens. It is now universally accepted that sovereignty entails a twofold responsibility: externally, to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and fundamental rights of all human beings within a state. In international human rights covenants, in UN customs, and in state tradition itself, sovereignty is today understood as assuming this twofold responsibility. Although the responsibility to protect principle is not yet customary international law, it is adequately conventional in practice to be considered as a *de facto* promising norm (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002).

Bellamy (2009) propagates that sovereignty as responsibility is founded on two propositions: first is the proposition that human beings possess inalienable rights that may never be withdrawn. These rights are universal, not relatively cultural. They also precede politics. Consequently, an individual's rights are not secondary to the rights of national groups, as the traditional notion of sovereignty postulates. These rights have three fundamental qualities: they are natural (inherent in human beings), equal (the same for everyone), and universal. Second, governments have the principal responsibility for defending their citizens' rights, but where they abuse those rights international society obtains rights and duties to enforce protection of the rights in question.

The recommended principle of sovereignty as responsibility has further been reinforced and mainstreamed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) whose report, 'The Responsibility to Protect,' has received substantial international consideration. However, Deng (2006) predicts that the idea needs to be developed, illustrated, and "given teeth" for successful application. Deng admits that among the central questions that will continue to characterize the international debates are what exactly the concept of protection means and who is better placed to realize it.

Conclusion

Against the background of what counts as humanitarian discussed earlier in this work, there was no doubt that Rwanda's situation warranted intervention. In his article, *Rescuing Thousands, Abandoning a Million: What Might an Emancipatory Intervention Have Looked Like in Rwanda,* Piiparinen (2007) recounts that "all it would have taken to avert the UN's failure would have been mere willpower or a simple effort of will on the part of individual actors." In sharing the same sentiments, Klinghoffer (2004) concurs that the moral resentment against genocide, and the dispute that more should have been done to save the victims, is certainly not misplaced.

From the analysis in the preliminary pages of this work on humanitarian intervention, it appears that we can hardly reach out to all victims of war. The failures of intervention in Rwanda reflect the challenges facing humanitarian intervention in contemporary international system. Challenges range from the lack of political will and commitment— exposing the transparent international political order that we save some, yet not all victims of war— to financial setbacks as another major challenge.

Just as the 'responsibility to protect' compels us to do, Kuperman (cited in Klinghoffer, 2004) advocates 'preventative reinforcement,' and argues that the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) should have been bolstered prior to the genocide. There is need for establishing a clear and general framework for humanitarian intervention. Finally, humanitarian intervention has far more meaning and legitimacy when it is accompanied by long-term commitment to conflict resolution and reconstruction of the political, economic and social systems of the war-torn country. Without long-term resolution, reconstruction and reconciliation, a country is likely to fall back into war.

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